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 As shown by the Macondo blowout, a deepwater well control event can result in 
loss of life, harm to the environment, and significant damage to company and industry 
reputation. Consistent adherence to safety regulations is a recurring issue in deepwater well 
construction. The two federal entities responsible for offshore U.S. safety regulation are 
the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) 
and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), with regulatory authorities that span well planning, 
drilling, completions, emergency evacuation, environmental response, etc. With such a 
wide range of rules these agencies are responsible for, safety compliance cannot be 
comprehensively verified with the current infrequency of on-site inspections. Offshore 
regulation and operational safety could be greatly improved through continuous remote 
real-time data monitoring.   
Many government agencies have adopted monitoring regimes dependent on real-
time data for improved oversight (e.g. NASA Mission Control, USGS Earthquake Early 
Warning System, USCG Vessel Traffic Services, etc.). Appropriately, real-time data 
 vii 
monitoring was either re-developed or introduced in the wake of catastrophic events within 
those sectors (e.g. Challenger, tsunamis, Exxon Valdez, etc.). Over recent decades, oil and 
gas operators have developed Real-Time Operations Centers (RTOCs) for continuous, pro-
active operations oversight and remote interaction with on-site personnel. Commonly seen 
as collaborative hubs, RTOCs provide a central conduit for shared knowledge, experience, 
and improved decision-making, thus optimizing performance, reducing operational risk, 
and improving safety. In particular, RTOCs have been useful in identifying and mitigating 
potential well construction incidents that could have resulted in significant non-productive 
time and trouble cost. 
 
In this thesis, a comprehensive set of recommendations is made to BSEE and USCG 
to expand and improve their regulatory oversight activities through remote real-time data 
monitoring and application of emerging real-time technologies that aid in data acquisition 
and performance optimization for improved safety. Data sets and tools necessary for 
regulators to effectively monitor and regulate deepwater operations (Gulf of Mexico, 
Arctic, etc.) on a continuous basis are identified. Data from actual GOM field cases are 
used to support the recommendations. In addition, the case is made for the regulator to 
build a collaborative foundation with deepwater operators, academia and other 
stakeholders, through the employment of state-of-the-art knowledge management tools and 
techniques. This will allow the regulator to do “more with less”, in order to address the fast 
pace of activity expansion and technology adoption in deepwater well construction, while 
maximizing corporate knowledge and retention. Knowledge management provides a 
connection that can foster a truly collaborative relationship between regulators, industry, 
 viii 
and non-governmental organizations with a common goal of safety assurance and without 
confusing lines of authority or responsibility. This solves several key issues for regulators 
with respect to having access to experience and technical know-how, by leveraging 
industry experts who would not normally have been inaccessible. On implementation of 
the proposed real-time and knowledge management technologies and workflows, a phased 
approach is advocated to be carried out under the auspices of the Center for Offshore Safety 
(COS) and/or the Offshore Energy Safety Institute (OESI). Academia can play an 
important role, particularly in early phases of the program, as a neutral playing ground 
where tools, techniques and workflows can be tried and tested before wider adoption takes 
place.  
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In the wake of Macondo, many efforts have been undertaken by industry and 
regulators to update standards, improve company best practices, and revise regulatory 
requirements to address the weaknesses exposed by the incident. Macondo highlights the 
complexity of operating in deepwater drilling environments and the associated exposure to 
occupational and process safety risks, even with some of the most sophisticated industrial 
systems available and a rig crew with a seven-year record without a lost-time incident 
(Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). Challenges that will need to be addressed in the 
coming years include: 
1. The drilling of deeper, more complex wells in deeper water and high 
temperature/high pressure (HPHT) geological environments that leave increasingly 
less room for error. Examples are the high-complexity wells that are now being 
planned and drilled in the Lower Tertiary and Jurassic Norphlet Plays in the 
offshore Gulf of Mexico. 
2. The accelerating pace of technology development and application required to 
construct such complex wells, with standards covering such technology and their 
adoption into regulation lagging far behind. An example of such acceleration is 
seen in the progressive adoption of managed pressure drilling (MPD) techniques in 
the offshore environment, with the timescale from conception to application 
typically on the order of a few years or less. Standards development (carried out by 






legislation and regulation, by contrast, take place on the timescale of a decade or 
more. 
3. Regulators stretched by increasing offshore activity, which is buoyed by a relatively 
stable and high price of oil. Despite considerable (and ultimately unsustainable) 
cost escalation in the market place for offshore goods and services in the past 
decade, large offshore discoveries coupled with a high oil price are allowing 
deepwater operators to contract for additional deepwater drilling rigs and plan 
expanding drilling campaigns, thereby creating almost insurmountable resourcing 
challenges for the regulator charged with maintaining oversight. 
4. The ongoing “Big Crew Change” and the loss of valuable deepwater well 
construction knowledge and expertise, which will further complicate access by 
regulators to scarce subject matter experts, who are also much better financially 
compensated when working for industry. 
5. Finding a collaborative environment between regulators and operators where the 
goals and objectives of both parties are met and antagonism and mistrust between 
the parties are minimized. A balance needs to be found where the regulator can 
effectively oversee offshore well construction in a “trust-but-verify” approach with 
a combination of effective prescriptive and performance-based guidelines that 
prevent train wrecks such as Macondo, while the operator can demonstrate 
compliance with the regulations but avoid being “over-regulated” with intrusive 
measures that may lack the perspective, expertise and experience of industry 






In this thesis, the argument will be made that progressive adoption of real-time 
monitoring and communication technologies by the regulator in collaboration with 
deepwater operators offers (at least partially) a solution to these challenges, a solution that 
also makes optimum use of available resources and thereby is sustainable in the longer 
term. Moreover, this thesis is aimed to show that adoption of real-time technologies for 
regulatory oversight progressively addresses the prevention and mitigation of severe 
offshore well problems. Two main aspects are tackled: 
1. Remote oversight through real-time monitoring and analysis technologies. A 
variety of reports have been written analyzing the sequence of events leading up to 
the Macondo blowout. Overarching themes that emerge from those reports show 
that breakdowns in process safety occurred in the following areas: 
 Adherence to approved programs 
 Barrier testing and validation 
 Blowout preventer (BOP) condition validation and operational readiness 
assessment 
 Anomaly detection and event mitigation 
 Management of change 
 Knowledge management 
This thesis will show that new real-time tools, systems and workflows have become 
available in recent years that can help avoid such breakdowns, and that real-time 
monitoring can itself be inserted as an additional barrier to avoid well construction 






2. Effective knowledge management, facilitated by the latest tools and techniques that 
provide regulators with access to the necessary subject matter expertise. As already 
indicated, with the Big Crew Change, the industry has a large amount of brainpower 
and experience on the brink of retirement. The responsibilities of these individuals 
will progressively fall upon less experienced and less knowledgeable personnel. In 
the competition for the best talent, the regulator has great difficulty to compete, and 
BSEE has continually been challenged to fulfill its needs for manpower while 
struggling at the same time to provide its personnel with the necessary offshore well 
construction experience. Rather than pit the regulator against the operator, it is 
proposed here that they instead join forces in a knowledge sharing network 
facilitated by state-of-the-art knowledge management tools. 
 
In an exemplary response to the Macondo blowout, great strides were made towards 
improving secondary and tertiary well control measures associated with improving BOP 
reliability, deployment of spill response measures, use of capping stacks, etc. It can be 
argued, however, that such measures are largely reactive and more could be done to 
augment the progressive adoption of Safety Cases on pro-active risk mitigation and 
prevention. The Macondo/Deepwater Horizon Case Example below demonstrates what the 
author has in mind in this regard, and introduces the main theme that will be explored 
further throughout the thesis.  
1.1 MACONDO/DEEPWATER HORIZON CASE EXAMPLE 
The Macondo blowout resulted in the loss of 11 lives on the Deepwater Horizon 






2011). A deepwater well, Macondo was drilled in 4,992 ft. of water in the Gulf of Mexico, 
with an expected total depth of 20,600 ft. (Chief Counsel’s Report, 2011). Drilling was 
commenced in October, 2009 by the rig Marianas; however, in November, 2009, Marianas 
was damaged by a nearby passing hurricane (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). 
Deepwater Horizon replaced Marianas and recommenced drilling Macondo in February, 
2010 (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). Already behind schedule, crews 
experienced multiple adverse drilling events, including multiple losses of circulation and a 
wellbore influx (kick) at 13,305 ft. that went undetected for 33 minutes (Deepwater 
Horizon Study Group, 2011). Drilling was terminated at 18,360 ft. after identifying a 123-
ft. thick pay sand in the well and determining that the well had “run out of drilling margin” 
(Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011).  
Temporary plugging and abandoning procedures were commenced, with a primary 
cementing plan that called for foam cement and 21 centralizers on a long string production 
liner (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). An insufficient number of centralizers were 
available on the rig, but the decision was eventually made to run the production liner with 
6 of the required 21 centralizers (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). After placing 
the production liner, an attempt was made to close the flapper valves in the float collar that 
are kept in an open position to fill the liner with wellbore fluids during placement 
(Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). Converting the valves should have taken one 
attempt with a pressure between 400 and 700 psi; however, nine attempts were made, 
reaching a final pressure of 3,142 psi, with no certain determination that the valves had 






Upon cement placement of a compressible foam cement slurry across the pay zone, 
with a lead and tail slurry of heavier conventional cement, it was deemed by decision 
makers that a cement bond log was unnecessary to confirm proper placement and bonding 
of the cement (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). Lab tests of the proposed slurry 
performed by the service company showed a minimum wait time of 48 hours prior to 
conducting the required positive and negative pressure tests (Deepwater Horizon Study 
Group, 2011). Crews waited 10.5 hours before conducting positive pressure test, 
confirming pressure integrity of the production liner and potentially compromising the 
integrity of the slurry (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011).  
To confirm isolation of the hydrocarbon bearing zone, crews performed a negative 
pressure test. The test failed, as there was more fluid flowback than expected (Deepwater 
Horizon Study Group, 2011). A second test occurred with similar results, and after 
deliberation, an onsite decision was made that the unexpected pressure observed was due 
to “bladder effect” (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). After determination of 
positive zonal isolation, which was an incorrect determination, procedures for 
abandonment were continued, including displacement of wellbore fluids with lighter 
seawater (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). The well was put into an underbalanced 
situation, allowing a hydrocarbon influx at the bottom of the well (Deepwater Horizon 
Study Group, 2011). The influx migrated up the well and blew out at surface, causing the 
explosion and spill that forever changed the offshore oil and gas industry (Deepwater 
Horizon Study Group, 2011). 
Figure 1.1 shows recorded data from the Macondo well operation approximately 1 






lost at 21:49 on April 20th, 2010 (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). Mud 
displacement operations are underway, with 14.7 ppg drilling mud being displaced by 
much lighter 8.6 ppg seawater. The operation removed the primary barrier, i.e. the 
hydrostatic pressure generated by the weighted mud column, which, coupled with a 
compromised well cementation and failing float system allowed gas and oil to come to 
surface. Even though this simple time-based graph only shows the limited information of 
standpipe pressure, flow- in and out of the well, and trip tank volume, sufficient 
information was present for the event to be detected and possibly contained (e.g. using 
controlled shut-in of the BOPs and proper diversion of the gas in the riser) prior to it 
escalating to its catastrophic impact. The circulation of the less dense seawater into the well 
at constant pump rate should have reflected in the standpipe pressure (orange line) as a net 
decrease in pressure (due to a reduction in fluid frictional pressure loss), when instead, the 
opposite is observed. Around 21:00 the standpipe pressure begins to increase and continues 
to do so even after circulation pumps are shut off around 21:08. This trend continues for a 
substantial amount of time. Additionally, for a short period of time, it can be observed that 
the flow out of the well (green line) exceeds the flow in the well (blue line). It is understood 
that during this time, flow data was somewhat unreliable due to simultaneous operations 
taking place (mud being pumped off the rig to supply boats for return to shore). However, 
as noted in Figure 1.1, a small window of time with no simultaneous operations directly 
shows that the well was flowing, and the increases observed in the standpipe pressure are 
a direct indication that the well was not under control. Note that the value of the data is not 
in the absolute numbers that are reached at any point in time, but instead in the relative 








Figure 1.1:  Real-time data from the Macondo blowout indicates symptomatic conditions 
of well flow could have been identified (from Deepwater Horizon Study 
Group, 2011).  
The primary lesson from Figure 1.1 is that had this data and its trend over time been 
actively monitored, whether by a company RTOC and/or regulator, and whether by human 
observers or an automated real-time system able to detect adverse data trends, these 
anomalies could have been identified and flagged, allowing decision makers at the rig site 
to take corrective action. From the first noticeable ‘symptom’ in the real-time data around 
21:00, there was approximately a 50 minute window before fluids were ejected at the drill 
floor. Even identifying symptoms right after circulation was suspended could have allotted 
approximately a 30 minute window for mitigating actions to be attempted. Even if the BOP 






attempted to separate the rig from the well. While it may not have been possible to stop the 
hydrocarbon flow, the window of time could have permitted proper alignment of the 
diverter, evacuation of the crew from the rig, etc.  
This example also highlights the potential for smart real-time technology to aid 
humans in detection of adverse events. Judging from the Macondo real-time sensor data, a 
straightforward relationship between the constant pump rate, the changes in standpipe 
pressure, the change in density of fluid pumped in and out of the well, as well as flow rate 
could have been utilized to automatically detect well flow symptoms and alert relevant 
stakeholders. Even simpler and more direct measurements are currently available to 
measure relevant pressures, flow and volumes, temperatures etc. associated with well 
barriers evaluated in pressure tests (e.g. leak-off tests, and positive and negative pressure 
tests after cementing), monitoring of well flow during connections and other flow checks, 
etc. Moreover, the possibility exists to port this data instantaneously across data-
communication and data-visualization systems to remote stakeholders for analysis and 
oversight purposes.   
The key point here is that such technology, at various levels of sophistication, does 
not need to be invented but is already available and can be leveraged to great effect for 
oversight purposes, by the operators themselves as well as the regulator. Regardless of 
certain unique characteristics of a well, there are universal characteristics with inherent 
benefit that, if monitored, can be exploited from commonly acquired data to prevent and 






1.2 THESIS OUTLINE 
There are seven chapters in this thesis. The first chapter is an introduction to the 
current and future challenges deepwater operators and regulators must address to ensure 
safe drilling and completion practices. Additionally, a brief introduction to the events and 
analysis of the data related the Macondo blowout are provided to show the motivation and 
reasoning behind this thesis. The second chapter provides a literature review of the 
employment of real-time data monitoring technologies in both the oil and gas industry as 
well as agencies within the U.S. government. In the third chapter, insight is provided on 
the U.S. offshore regulatory structure and focuses the discussion on the areas in the well 
construction process in most need of improved regulatory oversight. The third chapter also 
summarizes the current regulatory requirements related to these areas. In the fourth chapter, 
current real-time data monitoring capabilities are presented in relation to the areas in most 
need of improved regulatory oversight. Field examples of real-time data monitoring are 
also presented in this chapter. The fifth chapter presents the case for regulators to employ 
various knowledge management concepts to improve in-house expertise, operational 
capabilities, and regulation development. In the sixth chapter, recommendations for 
implementation of real-time data monitoring technologies as well as future work related to 
addressing other technology and safety matters in deepwater drilling and completion 
operations are presented. The seventh chapter provides a list of final key conclusions drawn 









Since the advent of the digital age, operations have become more and more 
dependent upon analysis of relevant data. The utilization of data allows for both 
optimization of performance as well as insight into potential safety hazards. Maturation of 
real-time data monitoring capabilities over the decades has resulted in successful 
implementation spanning a variety of sectors, both in industry and government.  
2.1 INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE WITH REMOTE DATA MONITORING CENTERS 
Oil & Gas RTOCs have a well-documented history dating back to the 1980s (Booth, 
2009, Booth, 2010). As technology has advanced, these centers have played a vital role in 
understanding downhole operations, as well as disseminating data to an audience no longer 
limited to on-site monitoring. While some RTOCs within the first “generation” played an 
active role in project execution, much of the mission of these earlier centers was data 
collection and future optimization (left of center in Figure 2.1) (Booth, 2009). The speed 
of data transmission and the ability to apply faster, more advanced modelling catalyzed the 
advent of the second “generation” of RTOCs (2000s), capable of playing a more pro-active 
role in both planning and execution of drilling programs (right of center in Figure 2.1). 
Booth (2010) outlines many of the initiatives by these international oil companies in 
establishing RTOCs for the North Sea and Gulf of Mexico, as well as Saudi Aramco’s 









Figure 2.1: Scale of the functionality and purpose of RTOCs (from Booth, 2010). 
These new data centers’ effectiveness improved with advancements in data 
acquisition and telecommunications, and became the solution for the gap in quick decision-
making in remote and complex drilling environments, such as the offshore deepwater 
environment. The second generation of RTOCs has demonstrated the ability to remotely 
monitor distant drilling operations and aid in improved decision-making process for 
reduced trouble time and improved process safety. 
The establishment of RTOCs has dominantly been a private venture, with some of 
the more notable state-owned petroleum companies following suit in more recent years 
(Khudiri et al., 2008, Khudiri et al., 2009, Pérez-Téllez et al., 2012). Shell has been at the 
forefront of the development of RTOCs in the 21st century and has a documented history 
of implementing continuous remote real-time monitoring on a global scale (van Oort et al., 






the Gulf of Mexico, has positioned the company to apply many new methods and 
technologies for improved deepwater drilling performance (Greenwood et al., 2005, van 
Oort et al., 2005, Hamed et al., 2007).  
The best characterization for RTOCs in the modern era would be “remote support 
for improved decision-making,” facilitating effective collaboration while maintaining 
operational responsibilities as traditionally assigned (van Oort, et al., 2005). With respect 
to collaboration, the global networking capability of RTOCs naturally make them “hubs” 
where expertise can virtually meet and discuss critical issues with wells located around the 
world. By fostering a pro-active well design and execution approach with a primary goal 
of reducing non-productive and lost time, not only is operational efficiency increased, but 
there is an increased situational awareness that, with the right culture, can lead to improved 
safety. 
2.2  GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE WITH REAL-TIME REMOTE MONITORING 
In the U.S., the term “government monitoring” is often seen as synonymous with 
Orwellian “Big Brother” control. It is often met with a negative sentiment and immediate 
rejection of such a concept. The Big Brother anxiety is not new to the oil & gas RTOC 
paradigm, and effective mitigation of these concerns has been documented in at least one 
RTOC implementation (van Oort et al., 2005). It is the author’s belief that through careful 
and collaborative use of real-time technologies for well construction oversight in offshore 
waters, the needs of both the regulator, representing the government of the U.S and thereby 
its citizens, as well as industry can be met and that the Big Brother concern can be 
effectively addressed. Note that there are precedents. With general welfare and safety of 






monitoring capabilities with highly sophisticated data processing and analysis algorithms 
in order to increase decision-making and response time and prevent catastrophic incidents. 
Examples are given in the following.   
2.2.1 National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) 
Arguably the foundational institution with regards to developments and 
advancements in real-time systems technology is the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). NASA would be unable to safely conduct space missions without 
the availability of ample data transmission in real-time. Real-time data monitoring has 
existed hand-in-hand with the advent of U.S. manned space flight. Mercury, the first NASA 
manned space flight program ushered in the era of truly real-time data telemetry, and 
computers had to process data simultaneously from multiple locations for decision-making 
within a 10 second window (James, 1981). Advancement of NASA’s real-time data 
technologies have continued to mature with the introduction of more complex spacecraft 
and more demanding mission objectives (James, 1981). However, the purpose of real-time 
data acquisition still remains to provide Mission Control “with the information needed to 
ensured crew safety and mission success” (James, 1981). 
Within hours prior to the launch of Space Shuttle Challenger, engineers for the 
manufacturer of the solid rocket boosters (SRB) expressed concerned that abnormally cold 
weather could have possibly compromised the integrity of the O-rings on the SRBs (Hall, 
2003). Following the Challenger disaster, NASA relied more heavily on real-time data 
processing, improving the decision-making process for subsequent shuttle missions 
(Muratore, 1990). The integration of knowledge-based real-time intelligent decision 






quickly process and interpret data and aid in decision-making (Tavana, 2004). With the 
progression of complexity in missions, a reflective growth in real-time data monitoring and 
assessing technologies, and thus safety assurance, could be observed. Since the advent of 
these systems, NASA has effectively ensured safely executed manned spaceflight missions 
for decades. 
2.2.2 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
In the past decade, the world witnessed stark reminders of the severe impact seismic 
activity can have on human life. Since it is impossible to stop an act of nature, the most 
prudent measures that can be taken are preparation and prediction. The use of real-time 
data for earthquake severity and propagation prediction has been an undertaking in recent 
decades in Japan, Taiwan, Mexico, Romania, Turkey, and more recently California (Böse 
et al., 2009). The United States Geologic Survey (USGS) is responsible for issuing 
earthquake alerts in California, and has led the development of an Earthquake Early 
Warning (EEW) system for the state (Böse et al., 2012). The system makes use of the 
existing site monitoring infrastructure of the California Integrated Seismic Network 
(CISN), monitoring and processing real-time data with the introduction of three parallel 
detection algorithms (Böse et al., 2012).  
Due to the high speed at which seismic waves propagate, this system must receive 
and process data, then make predictions and warnings within seconds in order to provide 
any legitimate window of time for reaction (Böse et al., 2009). The Onsite algorithm 
processes data input from P-wave detection of two nearby stations to estimate the size, 
severity, and ground velocity of the earthquake. This algorithm provides very fast although 






approach which assesses the likelihood that the incoming real-time data is in fact an 
earthquake. The algorithm is also employed to estimate magnitude, location, and time of 
origin. Requiring a minimum of four stations detecting activity, estimates are made at an 
average of 20 seconds after earthquake onset at the epicenter. The ELarmS algorithm is 
network-based, employing data from multiple sources within a large area, thus resulting in 
more accurate, but slower, estimations. The earthquake hypocenter is estimated by 
searching 965 square miles of land area, comparing predicted P-wave speed and actual P-
wave detection at stations. The three algorithms are then processed through a decision 
module that finalizes the prediction and issues warnings to users. While the final 
implementation of this monitoring system is still in need of funding development and 
funding (Böse et al., 2009), the EEW shows promise for reliable earthquake alerts to 
maximize the window of opportunity for preparation.    
2.2.3 U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) 
The USCG is charged with facilitating safe and efficient transit of commercial 
traffic in federal ports and waterways. Established in the 1970s in eight ports, USCG Vessel 
Traffic Services (VTS) originally primarily relied on radio communications for facilitation 
of safe waterways (Pietraszewski, 1996). After the passing of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
in the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, VTS technological advancements became seen 
as vital to ensuring pro-active real-time traffic management for improved safety and 
environmental protection (Pietraszewski, 1996).  
The advent of the marine Automatic Identification System (AIS) in the 1990s has 
made efforts to achieve this mission significantly more efficacious as compared to the days 






a structure in which a VTS operator can monitor speeds and headings of multiple vessels 
in real-time to effectively coordinate traffic via VHF data transmissions from vessels 
(Schwer, 2011). AIS can also transmit vessel-to-vessel, improving mariner situational 
awareness and critical decision-making for collision avoidance (Schwer, 2011). VTS 
operators can also intervene by notifying vessels that deviate from safe headings, as well 
as arrange traffic schemes when certain areas of a waterway may be shutdown. The 
adoption of real-time technology such as AIS has significantly advanced the ability of VTS 
to perform traffic management pro-actively and to aid in preventing hazards to human life 
and the environment. To date, VTS now has operations in 12 major ports through the U.S., 
utilizing radio communications, radar, waterway cameras, and AIS to ensure safe transit of 
commodities vital to the U.S. economy (U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center, 2014). 
2.2.4 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Similar to the USCG, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been 
responsible for the surveillance and safe coordination of air traffic throughout U.S. 
airspace. As close to 7,000 aircraft occupy U.S. airspace at any given time, efficiency 
related to all-time high delays as well as safety become an ever-growing concern (Kovell 
et al., 2012). It is anticipated that air traffic density will only increase in the coming 
decades, increasing traffic controller workloads (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013). 
The traditional method for air traffic surveillance has been the use of both conventional 
radar and a beacon system employing transponders on aircraft (Kovell et al., 2012). These 
dated tracking technologies provide a limited set of data (position, velocity, altitude) 
(Kunzi et al., 2011, Kovel et al., 2012) to air traffic controllers, thus relying on the 






aircraft are equipped with much more advanced avionics, capable of providing a greater 
and more accurate quantity of information to air traffic controllers (Kunzi et al., 2011) 
A new initiative underway by the FAA is the implementation of NextGen Air 
Transportation System. NextGen is a “comprehensive overhaul of the National Airspace 
System” for improved air traffic efficiency and safety (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2011). One of the major efforts in this undertaking is the transition from the conventional 
air traffic surveillance systems to the employment of the Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) system (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). The 
ADS-B system entails multiple facets of information broadcasting, transmitting data from 
aircraft-to-air traffic control (ATC), ATC-to-aircraft, as well as aircraft-to-aircraft (Estes 
et al., 2010). ADS-B as a whole provides a larger and more accurate operational picture to 
both controllers and pilots, with more frequent transmission rates than radar, providing 
“higher position and velocity accuracy, direct heading information as well as geometric 
and barometric altitude (Kunzi et al., 2011).” Multiple aircraft in vicinity of one another 
can also utilize data transmissions to calculate relative range and bearing for collision 
avoidance (Kovell et al., 2012). FAA regulations mandate that aircraft in most U.S. 
airspace be capable of ADS-B broadcasting by 2020 (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2011). ADS-B has been successfully employed in multiple regions of U.S. airspace, 
including helicopter traffic in the Gulf of Mexico (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). 
This advancement in air traffic management enables traffic controllers to minimize aircraft 
separation, coordinate more efficient traffic patterns, in addition to reducing risks of 






A common theme within these examples is the relationship between efficiency and 
safety. Better-informed critical decision-making can translate into fewer mistakes, which 
relates to improved efficiency and increased safety. The use of advancing data transmission 
as well as intelligent processing systems by these agencies has enabled greater situational 
awareness by government agents and in return greater situational awareness by those that 
fall under the agents’ responsibilities, such as astronauts, persons residing in earthquake-
prone areas, commercial vessel traffic, and the commercial and general aviation 
communities. This improved situational awareness yields better decision-making and 
mitigated risk by data-monitoring government agencies. Many facets of these real-time 
data monitoring capabilities could be employed by offshore regulators, such as utilization 
of the already established data transmission architecture in the Gulf of Mexico, artificial 
intelligence and simple algorithms to establish relationships between data parameters and 
previous well experiences, and identification of situations needing immediate intervention 












Offshore Regulatory Structure and Requirements 
There are many parameters and variables associated with offshore well 
construction. Not all will be of interest to the regulator, even though they may be of great 
interest to the operator (especially parameters associated with performance, well 
construction time and cost optimization). This chapter will attempt to delineate what well 
construction information should be of interest to the regulator. This requires an 
investigation into offshore regulatory structure and requirements.   
3.1  REGULATORY AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) primarily designates the 
Secretaries of the Interior and of the department in which the USCG is operating (currently 
Homeland Security) with the authorities to “promulgate and enforce” regulations for 
offshore exploration and production operations in the United States (“Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act”, 2000).  While retained by the respective Secretaries, these authorities 
are delegated to such agencies as BSEE and the USCG.  There are a few areas of 
pertinence to this research worth noting in the act. First, regarding public interest, OCSLA 
emphasizes the value of natural resources possessed by the OCS, with the Federal 
Government as its custodian for the public. Additionally OCSLA mandates that OCS 
operations should be conducted “using technology, precautions, and techniques sufficient 
to prevent or minimize the likelihood of blowout, loss of well control (…) or other 
occurrences which may cause damage to the environment or to property, or endanger life 






utilization of the best available and safest technologies (BAST) on new and existing (when 
practicable) drilling and production operations. 
With respect to safety inspections, OCSLA requires that the lease/permit holder 
give access to BSEE and USCG inspectors to any requested records or information of 
onsite operations relevant to health, safety, or environmental stewardship (“Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act”, 2000). BSEE and the USCG must independently or jointly 
conduct a scheduled onsite safety inspection once per year with additional unannounced, 
periodic inspections. For investigations, the act mandates that either BSEE or the USCG 
shall investigate incidents involving a major fire, major oil spill due to OCS operations, 
death or serious injury, as well as allegations regarding violations of OCSLA safety 
regulations. The act also gives BSEE and the USCG the authority to require any evidence 
necessary for proper investigation of an incident. 
BSEE is responsible for the promulgation and enforcement of Title 30, Chapter II 
of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). Derived from OCSLA, this set of 
regulations, particularly part 250, applies to oil, gas, and sulfur operations related to 
exploration, development, and production on the OCS. The USCG is responsible for the 
promulgation and enforcement of regulations within both Title 33 and 46 with respect to 
OCS safety of life at sea and environmental protection related to commercial vessels, 
including mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs) and fixed and floating facilities. When 
discussing the use of real-time data monitoring for regulation, BSEE would likely be the 
primary beneficiary of such an implementation; however, it is important to keep the USCG 






these areas of regulation are intricately interrelated and are vital for both agencies to have 
an understanding. 
The primary objective in ensuring safety in drilling and completions is to minimize 
loss of well control events and prevent blowouts, thus preventing injury, loss of life, and 
damage to the environment. One study of U.S. OCS exploration from 1992 to 2006 
identified the top contributing factors for blowout events (Izon et al., 2007), as can be seen 
in Figure 3.1. Within this time frame, almost half of the recorded incidents involved an 
improperly cemented well. Note that this study only considered incident data up to 2006, 
not including the Macondo incident in 2010, in which a major contributing factor was the 
lack of proper zonal isolation by the cement job on the production casing. Along with 
cementing, these statistics give the direction and motivation as to where regulatory 
oversight could be improved using real-time data monitoring. Four areas of real-time data 
monitoring that would encompass the majority of contributing factors to uncontrolled well 
control events are: 
 BOP reliability (equipment failure) 
 Formation strength (formation fracture) 
 Zonal isolation (cementing) 








Figure 3.1: Contributing factors to blowouts in the U.S. OCS from 1992 to 2006, 
expressed as percentage of total occurrence. Note the prominent position of 
cementing as a contributing factor (from Izon et al., 2007). 
These categories not only encompass many of the contributing factors to blowouts, 
but they also are critical points in the drilling and completions process.  As stated by 
Wassel (2012) regarding regulation of offshore drilling:  
 
The Macondo well blowout demonstrated the need for a pro-active approach to 
offshore drilling in U.S. waters that integrates all aspects of operations that could 
affect occupational and system safety.  
 
Focusing on these areas, utilizing real-time data monitoring technologies, regulators could 






operations. The current regulations surrounding these subjects must first be understood, 
upon which an implementation of regulatory oversight using real-time data monitoring can 
be proposed. 
3.2 BOP REGULATION 
BSEE regulations outline requirements and frequency for testing BOPs. Basically 
put, the BOP system and associated components must be pressure tested (30 CFR 250.447): 
 When installed. 
 Within 14 days of the previous test. 
 Before drilling out each casing or liner. 
 
In this thesis, only subsea BOPs will be considered. In theory surface BOP stack 
oversight is a less complicated matter in comparison to subsea BOPs. The intent of BOP 
pressure tests is to verify that there are no leaks in the system. The basic requirements for 
pressure testing are that all components must be tested with first a low pressure test between 
200 and 300 psi (30 CFR 250.448). Following a satisfactory low pressure test of 
components, a high pressure test for ram components must be conducted to the maximum 
working pressure of the equipment or to 500 psi greater than the calculated maximum 
anticipated surface pressure (MASP) (30 CFR 250.448). Additionally, annular components 
must be tested to 70 percent of the rated working pressure of the equipment or to a pressure 
approved in the application for permit to drill (APD) (30 CFR 250.448). The duration of 
these tests must be for at least five minutes for subsea components (30 CFR 250.448). 
In addition to the basic requirements, 30 CFR 250.449 outlines additional 






 Stump testing subsea BOP systems with water before installation at the mudline. 
 Alternation of tests between control pods. 
 Function testing annular and ram BOP every 7 days between pressure tests. 
 Variable bore ram test requirements. 
 ROV intervention requirements. 
 
Along with satisfying these requirements, 30 CFR 250.449 also requires 
notification of BSEE at least 72 hours prior to stump testing and subsea installation testing 
and recording of all results to make available to BSEE upon request. This portion of the 
regulations is quite detailed and prescriptive, but rightly so:  BOPs are a critical system 
that must function when needed. However, these requirements result in very frequent 
testing that can take many hours out of a critical operations window and is a disruptive and 
costly repeat exercise to the operator. Also, BSEE requires testing and maintaining records 
for inspection upon request. This indicates that every test of this critical safety component, 
while required, is not witnessed by BSEE. Therefore it can be assumed that many of these 
tests are only audited after the fact.   
3.3 FORMATION STRENGTH TEST REGULATION 
BSEE regulations require that a formation strength test be performed after drilling 
out every intermediate casing (or liner) shoe (30 CFR 250.427). Depending on the 
circumstances, an appropriate test between a leak-off test (LOT) or formation integrity test 
(FIT) must be selected. A FIT is more likely to be undertaken where it is undesirable to 
compromise the integrity of the wellbore or formation, or a well-established fracture 






a predetermined pressure (based on maximum desired mud weight), and it is expected the 
formation will not break down. The pressure selected should remain within the realm of 
linear elasticity of the formation strength. Once the desired pressure is achieved without 
fracture, the test is successful, and the pressure in equivalent mud weight is capable of 
being utilized without damaging the shoe.   
A LOT is intended to more accurately identify characteristics of the wellbore and 
formation. In doing so, the strength of the shoe is permanently weakened. The pressure at 
which the fracture induced by the LOT closes, known as the fracture closure pressure 
(FCP), is the best estimate of the minimum principal stress of the formation (most likely 
the minimum horizontal stress in the normal faulting environment predominating the GOM 
offshore environment, see van Oort and Vargo, 2007). The minimum horizontal stress 
provides important geomechanical information about the formation, and can aid in 
appropriate development of geomechanics models and fracture gradient plots (van Oort 
and Vargo, 2007). An important note is that fracture reopening pressure (FRP), which is 
near or equal to FCP, is now the upper threshold regarding formation fracture in a well that 
a LOT has been performed (van Oort and Vargo, 2007). Thus, drilling fluids and equivalent 
circulating densities must reflect the lower strength of the wellbore, with the most accurate 
value for the “fracture gradient” provided by the fracture propagation pressure (FPP). The 
expected mud weight tolerances or selected mud weights should be identified for every 
shoe point in the APD, and test results are subject to BSEE audit. As with BOP test data, 
it can be assumed that many of these tests are only audited after the fact, with few if any 






3.4 CASING AND CEMENTING REGULATION 
Casing and cementing programs must, as required by BSEE regulations, be 
developed and certified by a professional engineer with sufficient expertise regarding the 
subject matter. The certification must be submitted with the APD and the approved casing 
and cementing program must be followed without deviation. Cementing design and 
execution must meet the minimum requirements of cement being placed in the annular 
space behind the bottom 500 ft. of casing and achieve 500 psi compressive strength before 
drilling out or conducting completion operations (30 CFR 250.420). More specific cement 
placement requirements are prescribed for the various casing types (30 CFR 250.421).  
Regarding wait-on-cement (WOC) times, BSEE prescribes a minimum required 12 hours 
of wait time under pressure prior to continuing drilling (30 CFR 250.422) for intermediate 
and production casing strings.  
With respect to pressure test requirements in the regulations, operations cannot be 
resumed until an acceptable positive pressure test has been performed. The parameters to 
meet requirements are that the string holds pressure for at least 30 minutes with no less 
than a 10 percent decline in pressure (30 CFR 250.423). For intermediate and production 
casing strings, this pressure must be at least 70 percent of the minimum internal yield of 
the string (30 CFR 250.423). For negative tests, a negative test will at least be required for 
the final casing string or liner (30 CFR 250.423). Negative test procedures must be 
submitted for approval with the APD, and successful test results must be documented.  
The American Petroleum Institute (API) provides guidance on recommended practices for 
properly installing and verifying flow barriers. To verify zonal isolation, the positive and 






isolating the well from formations that have flow potential. Some of the criteria for 
interpreting acceptable or unacceptable test results include (API RP 96):  
 Pressure change during hold time 
 A visual observation of leak 
 A difference between pressure-up volume and bleed-back volume 
 A visual observation of fluid level 
Discussed later, API RP 96 provides guidance on alternative methods of verifying zonal 
isolation should pressure testing not be feasible. In the case of any failed negative pressure 
test, BSEE must be notified and must approve the remedial actions. 
3.5  DRILLING EVENT REGULATION 
Currently there is no regulation prescribing specific requirements regarding drilling 
event detection. However, BSEE regulations do require that wells must be kept under 
control at all times, in particular using BAST “to monitor and evaluate well conditions and 
to minimize the potential for the well to flow or kick (30 CFR 250.401).” Additionally, 
operators must “use and maintain equipment necessary to ensure the safety and protection 
of personnel, equipment, natural resources, and the environment (30 CFR 250.401).”  
With this charge to the operators, it could be argued that the application of intelligent 
drilling event detection software would be in the interest of applying BAST to the industry.  
As will be argued in the following, it is quite apparent that the pro-active use of adverse 
drilling event detection software would greatly benefit the industry from a safety 
improvement standpoint, and should therefore be of interest to both operators and 







Current Real-Time Data Capabilities 
In the following sections, an overview is provided of the state-of-the-art in real-
time monitoring capabilities that can be readily leveraged to facilitate remote oversight that 
addresses all the regulatory requirements discussed in the previous chapters. The treatment 
of these capabilities in this thesis is neither exhaustive nor complete: it mainly serves to 
illustrate to those less familiar with real-time technologies and RTOCs what is already 
readily available in terms of enabling capabilities in the hope to lend credence to the idea 
that remote regulatory oversight of offshore operations is not a far-fetched as it may sound 
when hearing about it for a first time.     
4.1 BOP RELIABILITY 
BOPs are frequently referred to as the last line of defense regarding total loss of 
well control. It is a very costly proposition to pull a BOP from the seafloor for repairs, 
while it is potentially even more costly to neglect a component failure. While company 
policies tend to put safety at the front of the minds of personnel, the decision to pull carries 
a hefty cost. Therefore, this decision must be made with as much pertinent information as 
possible. In order to have a sound picture of BOP reliability, certain areas must be covered: 
 Usage (cycles) 
 Failure impact  







Modern-day BOPs, especially subsea BOPs, have a vast array of working 
components. A common BOP stack configuration that might be used would include two 
annular preventers, four ram-type preventers, a casing shear ram, and multiple choke and 
kill line outlets (Holand, 2001). Current subsea BOP control systems are predominantly 
multiplex-controlled for fast activation in deepwater applications (Holand, 2001). In an 
extensive series of studies, subsea BOP system reliability data was collected, the second 
phase of which particularly focused on Gulf of Mexico deepwater wells (Holand, 2001). 
Between July 1997 and May 1998, data was recorded for 83 wells with water depths 
ranging from 1,335 to 6,725 ft. (Holand, 2001). Table 4.1 outlines the results of the study 
with an overview of recorded BOP failures. Additionally, Table 4.1 shows the relatively 
long periods of time (mean time to failure) these components are employed until failure.  
It should be noted that over 50% of failures were associated with control systems (Holand, 
2001). However, only three rigs employed a multiplex control system at the time (Holand, 
2001). 







A later Gulf of Mexico BOP reliability study from 2004 to 2006 confirmed failure 
statistics very similar to previous studies, including Holand (Sattler and Gallander, 2010). 
This would validate the hopes that these are certainly robustly built machines. However, 
even though the likelihood of failure may be low, the consequences of failure still dictate 
a high risk involved with BOP reliability. Over time, these components are cycled 
potentially hundreds of times. Therefore it is important to have a clear record, in real-time, 
of total component cycles since the last maintenance period, in particular with the control 
system. Capability is becoming available to monitor BOP control system function in real-
time (Chapman and Brown, 2009). Thus, a more pro-active vision of real-time function 
data can accurately identify when a certain component may be more likely to fail.   
Upon failure or malfunction of a BOP component, an investigation must be 
performed to assess the operational and safety impact the failure may have on BOP 
reliability. It is inevitable that in the field components will fail, and it would be naïve to 
assume major operators do not have teams of experts to conduct such assessments.  
However, with no discredit to this expertise, these assessments may take extended periods 
of time to research failure effects, remedies, and any regulatory compliance involved. 
When BOP components fail at 6,000 ft. of water depth, 200 nautical miles from shore, with 
an 18,000 ft. well with a narrow pore pressure fracture gradient, at a rig rate of over $1M 
per day, assessing the reliability of a BOP becomes a very critical exercise, and convincing 
regulators of its soundness could be an equally tolling task. Current technologies can 
provide an accurate failure effects analysis of BOP reliability based on failed components 
in a matter of minutes (Huse and Alme, 2013). This type of software is commonly found 






limitations to this software. Currently, manual troubleshooting must be undertaken in order 
to first identify the failure point. Then the failure must be manually entered into the 
software to then receive a final assessment of BOP reliability. If this technology were to 
be automated to assess, in real-time, BOP reliability based on sensor data connected to 
BOP components, this would become a much more valuable tool. There has been a similar 
effort as of recent to provide an assessment of BOP “health” integrating existing alarms 
and data in real-time (McKay et al., 2012). Regulatory oversight and safety in the industry 
could benefit from requirements for a technology capable of this type of performance.  
Based on BSEE regulations alone, there is a significant amount of testing required 
to validate BOP stack operability and reliability. The intent of these tests is to verify each 
BOP component’s ability to hold pressure. As discussed earlier, BSEE requires both high 
and low pressure (between 200 and 300 psi) tests to be conducted. Historically, pressure 
data and leak detection has been verified with an analog circular chart recorder (CCR) 
(Winters et al., 2007). It can be observed from the example in Figure 4.1 that the CCR has 
a relatively poor resolution, particularly in the case of the low pressure test. This can lead 
to a fairly subjective judgment as to whether or not the leak test was passed. Based on the 
resolution of the CCR, acceptable “flat-lines” typically reflect a pressure change/decline 
rate of –4 to –3 psi/min (Winters et al., 2007). One study found in over 100 sets of BOP 
pressure tests (10 to 25 tests per set), flat-lines determined as “acceptable” by personnel 
witnessing the tests ranged from 4 to over 20 psi/min (Franklin et al., 2011). By recording 
tests digitally, resolution can be improved, typically on the higher order of –3 psi/min or 
better, and data can also be transmitted in real-time to remote locations for better 







Figure 4.1: Example of a low and high pressure BOP test as recorded on a CCR (from 
Franklin et al., 2004). The red line is indication of test pressure “flat-lines.” 
Note the relatively poor resolution for low pressure testing in the vicinity of 
250 psi. 
Additionally, as deepwater and ultra-deepwater drilling become more 
commonplace, the combination of the use of relatively compressible synthetic-based 
drilling fluids, their ability to dissipate heat more slowly than water-based counterparts, 
and the temperature profile of extreme water depths greatly affect pressure readings at 
surface (Franklin et al., 2004). As required by regulation, subsea BOP component test 
pressures must be held constant for at least five minutes to be considered passing. Thus, an 
extensive period of time must transpire during the leak test in order for pressure to 
equilibrate and more confidently discern between fluid compressibility and temperature 






series of required BOP tests consumes. In this case, almost 14 hours are dedicated to 
completed pressure tests for all BOP components with a significant portion of downtime 
as well as time waiting for pressure decay to dissipate during tests. Combined with the 
required recurrence of these tests, this leads to a large portion of operational time devoted 
to tests on rigs with expensive day rates, potentially adding haste to operations. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Example of a single series of component pressure tests for a deepwater Gulf 
of Mexico subsea BOP, as required by regulation. Note in this case, the 
complete series of tests consumes roughly 14 hours of operational time, a 
common occurrence for subsea BOP testing. 
Since these tests are required to be conducted at least every 14 days, this 






have shown that using more accurate digital data, pressure decay and pressure leaks can be 
more easily differentiated (Franklin et al., 2004, Winters et al., 2007). The significant 
advantage to this is the development of relationships in real-time data to accurately predict 
the success of leak test without performing full tests for every component (Franklin et al., 
2004, Franklin et al., 2011). This facilitates reduced downtime without sacrificing the 
improved accuracy of real-time digital data. 
For this thesis, a commercially available software and BOP testing service was used 
to investigate capabilities of more accurate test validation and remote oversight. A visit 
was made to the service company’s RTOC where BOP testing is monitored and verified.  
RTOC personnel were readily available to provide technical support for field personnel in 
analyzing test data. The particular software used employs a thermal compensation leak 
detection (TCLD) algorithm, which establishes the expected pressure and temperature 
behavior for the particular system being tested and the fluid being used based on a 
“benchmark test.” The BOP tests are broken down into systems based on relative volumes 
being tested. For example, all tests that include the test manifold have a small volume and 
are therefore associated with that system. The benchmark test is simply a BOP component 
pressure test taken to a rate of decay less than 3 psi/min (flat-line) on a system. With 
relatively little volume change between subsequent tests, the TCLD algorithm can then 
predict in a much shorter time frame that the test underway will pass. 
The user interface for this software can be seen in Figure 4.3. In this particular case, 
while passing the test according to the TCLD, a discrepancy was observed in the volume 
pumped based on previous test volumes associated with the same system. The alignment 






only the components upstream of the valve. The valve was opened and the subsequent tests 
passed, and all required components in that particular procedure were properly tested 
according to the schematic (Figure 4.4). Figure 4.5 displays the history for this particular 
test of components on a subsea BOP for a deepwater operator. It should be noted that this 
information is all available in an automatically generated report based on the recorded data 
from the software, a convenient application for regulators to access online at any time after 
the test with applicable permissions from the operator. Additionally recorded in these 
reports are the control pod function tests, which are regulatory requirements by BSEE as 
well (Figure 4.6). Two important notes should be made. First, this discrepancy was not 
discovered by rig personnel, but the service technician, which emphasizes the need for 
technically competent remote oversight. Second, comparing the digital output in Figure 4.3 
to the CCR output such as in Figure 4.1, this discrepancy would have most likely never 
been caught. Higher quality digital real-time data enabled a closer eye to be kept on a small, 









Figure 4.3: BOP component testing user interface. Displayed is the test in which an 
incorrect valve alignment according to the procedure was mistakenly tested.  
While passing the TLCD test, it was noticed that the volume pumped was 
relatively lower than volumes in previous tests (left column). With the aid of 
the user display and digital real-time data, this mistake was identified and 
corrected, and the subsequent test with the correct alignment passed. 








Figure 4.4: The BOP component test valve alignment for the discussed test 11 according 
to the company’s test procedure. This schematic is both constructed and 
presented in the software, as well as provided in the automatically generated 
report, available electronically 24 hours a day. Red indicates pressured lines 
testing that respective side of a component that isolates the pressure, while 
blue indicated the non-pressured side. The software is a “smart schematic” in 
which it tracks along the pressured line component ratings and required test 
pressures, preventing overpressurization of components and ensuring every 








Figure 4.5: The pressure test history for test 11, as presented in the automatically 
generated report. Test 11 failed due to an immediate pressure spike that 
exceeded the pressure test limitations. 11a proceeded and technically passed 
the TCLD test, albeit an incorrect valve alignment. Due to a volume 
discrepancy displayed in the digital real-time data, the incorrect alignment 
was discovered and the components were subsequently retested (11b). 
Volumes pumped for 11, 11a, and 11b were 1.10, 0.80, and 2.20 bbl., 








Figure 4.6: As displayed in the automatically generated report, a record of control pod 
function testing, also a requirement in BSEE regulations. (Courtesy of IPT 
Global) 
As can be seen, there are many available technologies and developing capabilities 
that improve awareness of BOP reliability and ensure proper execution of tests using real-
time data. All of these could be – or already are – fully virtualized for remote data 
communication and monitoring. This remote monitoring technology could be implemented 
by the regulator with relative ease and would significantly improve oversight while 
potentially minimizing delays in offshore operations. While there are currently no concrete 
regulatory requirements for such provisions, mandating real-time data to monitor and 
assess such information could be addressed through 30 CFR 250.440. This rule requires 
that BOP systems and associated components must be maintained to ensure proper well 






testing software validates the concept of remote real-time data monitoring for improved 
regulatory oversight on many fronts including 24-hour remote access, improved data 
resolution, and an automated process by which safety and efficiency are improved. 
4.2 FORMATION STRENGTH 
Formation strength tests are performed with a number of intended objectives (van 
Oort and Vargo, 2007): 
 To verify the strength and integrity of the cement bond located at the casing shoe.  
 To determine the wellbore’s ability and limitations for enduring a formation fluid 
influx (i.e. kick tolerance).   
 To determine minimum and maximum equivalent pressures the wellbore will 
permit prior to failure. 
 
Verifying the strength and integrity of the cement bond provides assurance that the 
cement properly isolated the previous hole section and no channels exist for formation 
fluids or gas to leak past the cement. Determining wellbore strength provides important 
information to prevent fracturing at the casing shoe when trying to control and circulate 
out well influxes. Determining the minimum and maximum tolerable pressures ensures 
wellbore stability and prevention of unintended fracturing. With better knowledge 
surrounding these serious operational hazards, a safer drilling program can be followed.  
Van Oort and Vargo (2007) give a thorough explanation of formation strength tests and 
recommendations for more accurate tests and interpretations.   
There are, however, certain factors that can contribute to improperly interpreted test 






profile, barite sag, and gel strength (van Oort and Vargo, 2007). Additionally, the location 
of the gauge of the cementing unit can affect the test data. While it is possible to account 
for these conditions, it has been verified that downhole pressure sensors can provide much 
more accurate pressure measurements at the shoe, thus preventing overestimation of shoe 
strength due to poorly interpreted tests (van Oort and Vargo, 2007). Figure 4.7 shows 
pressure data from a deepwater Gulf of Mexico well FIT in which the formation was to be 
tested to a desired equivalent mud weight of 13.0 ppg with a synthetic-based mud. A large 
discrepancy was observed between surface pressure and downhole recorded PWD data, 
attributed to the effect of mud gel strength. The difference in measurements equates to a 
0.36 ppg mud weight for this particular test, a considerable value when the typical industry 
standard for a mud window is 0.5 ppg. This shows the value in downhole real-time data 
being applied for critical formation strength measurements. 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Observed difference between downhole PWD data measurements and 
extrapolated downhole pressure from surface measurements (from van Oort 






Real-time data acquisition of critical tests such as formation strength tests provides 
continuous measurement recording of test conditions. Accuracy in test interpretation can 
be lost if these tests are manually recorded, as seen in Figure 4.8. Software is available to 
provide remote real-time witnessing of these tests and have been employed in the industry 
(van Oort et al., 2005). Additionally, geomechanical data from LOTs has been successfully 
integrated with real-time downhole pressure data update the pore pressure-fracture gradient 
(PPFG) profile of the well (Greenwood et al., 2005). These capabilities could be adopted 
by regulators to verify test interpretation and similarity to predictions in the approved APD 
as well as ensure the required safe drilling margin is being used according to the approved 
APD. Implementing real-time data monitoring at this critical stage in drilling can provide 
another snapshot that contributes to an overall continuous oversight without excessive 
intrusion or interruption. Regulators can witness tests in real-time and verify that the kick 
tolerance and tolerable mud weight according to the FIT or LOT is concurrent with the 
predicted mud weight in the approved APD. If a continuous real-time update is 









Figure 4.8: Comparison of electronic recorded data versus manually hand recorded data 
and the accuracy of data interpretation (from van Oort and Vargo, 2007). 
4.3 ZONAL ISOLATION (CEMENTING) 
Arguably one of the most critical procedures in well construction is zonal isolation, 
particularly isolation of zones capable of flowing to surface. With the drastic technological 
advancements of offshore drilling, cementing has remained relatively unchanged in 
practice versus the increase in depth and complexity of offshore drilling and completions.  
As seen in Figure 3.1 cementing is by far the most common contributing factor to blowouts. 
The complication of cementing in deepwater and achieving proper cement placement is 
compounded by the well temperature profile, pressures experienced, placement challenges, 
and wait-on-cement (WOC) time (Ravi et al., 1999). 
Much preparatory work is undertaken to ensure the best slurry additives, densities, 
and volumes are selected to accomplish the cementing job. These slurries are similarly 
constrained in static and dynamic densities by the PPFG window of the well. Thus, 






Additionally, spacer fluid must effectively prevent contamination of the cement slurry.  
Cement compressive strength can be significantly degraded due to contamination from 
improper displacement of drilling fluids or influx of formation fluids into the wellbore. In 
addition to appropriate spacer fluid volumes, care must be taken to complete full circulation 
of wellbore fluids prior to cementing in order to further prevent any contamination by 
debris. WOC time is also a critical value to accurately predict and adhere to.   
Accurate placement of cement slurries across hydrocarbon bearing zones is critical 
to ensuring proper zonal isolation. The significant majority of zonal isolation problems can 
be avoided by achieving successful placement of cement. Placement of cement can be 
appropriately monitored utilizing real-time data from the rig and/or cementing service 
company. Figure 4.9 is cementing real-time data from a 5-½ inch production liner for a 
deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico. From this data being observed in real-time, 
reasonable verification of adherence to the approved cementing program can be performed, 
particularly when actual vs. planned data is compared: the real-time data can be compared 
to the cementing program spacer and slurry volumes, densities, and pressures to ensure 
proper placement with associated top-of-cement (TOC), an accurate beginning of WOC 
time, etc. This practice of cement placement verification can also be found in API Standard 
65-2, suggesting that data such as “rates, volumes, densities, pressures, fluid rheologies, 
etc.” can be used to monitor proper cement placement or to identify discrepancies in a 
failed job (API Standard 65-2).  
In the  particular case of the well in Figure 4.9, when comparing the data to the 
approved cement program (Table 4.2) some discrepancies were identified. The spacer 






prescribed (71 bbl.). The lead cement slurry can be observed in the increase of fluid density 
to around 15.5 ppg, but only 54 bbl. are pumped before the tail slurry, near the prescribed 
density (16.4 ppg) is introduced. This tail slurry has a lower volume (47 bbl.) which carries 
the risk of either improperly isolating the hydrocarbon bearing zone(s) or being either 
contaminated to a higher extent or over-displaced, leaving the shoe improperly isolated. 
While no adverse effects may have been experienced in this case, the example illustrates 












Table 4.2: Fluid and slurry densities and volumes according to the approved cementing 
program for the 5-½ inch liner cement job in Figure 4.9. 
 
Once the estimated WOC time is observed, a minimum compressive strength of 
500 psi should be present as the cement hardens. From this point two tests are undertaken 
to verify the quality of hydraulic isolation that the cement job has achieved. The first test, 
the casing test, is a positive pressure test, exerting pump pressure inside the casing or liner 
for an extended period of time. This test is performed to verify both that there are no leaks 
in the cement job and that the casing (or liner) and wellhead seal assemblies can withstand 
pressures from the well (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). It is very important that 
this test is performed only after the prescribed WOC time. If the cement is still in a dormant 
phase, expansion of the casing or liner from the internal pressure will put the cement around 
the outside of the casing in tension, plastically deforming the cement. This hinders a 
satisfactory bond between the cement and casing and can result in a micro-channel for 
hydrocarbons to leak by. If the positive casing test yields successful results, a negative 
pressure test is performed to likewise verify effective prevention of hydrocarbon flow by 






By putting the well in an underbalanced scenario by decreasing the pressure inside 
the string, it can be verified whether or not the cement is capable of keeping flow zones in 
check (Chief Counsel’s Report, 2011). When this is performed, either measurements in 
flow or pressure can be used to verify whether or not the well is flowing. This is a very 
critical stage in the construction of the well. By inducing a net “negative” pressure in the 
well, it has been intentionally put in an underbalanced scenario with a yet-to-be validated 
cement job. As witnessed with the Macondo blowout, if the negative test is poorly executed 
and improperly interpreted, the consequences can be disastrous. If it is not possible to 
perform the negative test or should test results be inconclusive, API RP 96 provides 
recommendations for alternative verification of zonal isolation. Figure 4.10 provides a 
categorization of barrier verification. It should be recalled that the most certain method to 
verify effective isolation by the cement job is through pressure testing. Confirmation 
methods (as shown in Figure 4.10) should be assessed within the appropriate context. For 
example, acoustic measurement data from a cement bond log (CBL) can be used to observe 
a satisfactory bond between the casing and cement as well as the location of the cement 
placement. Beyond this, the CBL is unable to be used to verify hydraulic isolation of flow 
zones. Thus, it would be inferred (possibly with other supplemental data) that zonal 







Figure 4.10: According to API RP 96, categories of verifying effective formation barriers 
by either testing or confirmation (from API RP 96). 
With these very dynamic operations, it becomes quite a challenge for the regulator 
to ensure proper adherence to what has been approved. Without data, this cannot be 
effectively accomplished. Without real-time data, especially related to cementing 
operations, a realization that improper adherence to the approved program is a costly fix if 
discovered after the job has been completed. As noted in one of the Macondo reports, there 
was no requirement to supply the regulator with evidence of a successful test result 
(National Academy of Engineering, 2011). Had the regulator been able to witness tests via 
real-time data, the anomalous results may have been brought under greater scrutiny. The 
regulator can employ software to monitor the real-time data of these placement operations 
in real-time and identify whether operations are executed in accordance with what the 






2006). After verification of cement placement based on the operator’s preparatory work 
and analysis of real-time data, the regulator can then ensure an accurate timeframe is 
respected for the WOC time. Once WOC time is observed, the regulator can then also 
witness positive and negative tests in real-time to verify casing integrity and hydraulic 
isolation of the well and formation fluids. Should the operator decide to run a CBL after 
the WOC time, this could be supplementary evidence witnessed in real-time to verify 
successful TOC placement and cement bond. 
Real-time data is a very valuable asset to the regulator to ensure compliance with 
what has been proposed and approved. WOC cement time can be properly recorded and 
monitored, and the respective positive and negative pressure tests can be witness remotely 
to ensure appropriate hydraulic isolation of pressured zones. It is believed by the author 
that effective remote cementing and zonal isolation monitoring by itself yields great 
benefits to improving safe offshore deepwater well construction. 
4.4 DRILLING EVENT DETECTION 
All of the areas previously discussed provide what could be referred to as a 
continuous “snapshot” of operations. However, an important gap in oversight is 
verification of safe practices while drilling. Real-time data could provide significant value 
in ensuring some level of oversight is maintained by the regulator, as to intervene when 
critical. This is also certainly the most contentious subject to consider with respect to 
regulatory real-time data monitoring. Many of the contributing factors to blowouts listed 
in Figure 3.1 can be prevented with the aid of effective real-time drilling data monitoring 






question to ask is how the regulator can maximize effective oversight without an inspector 
standing on the drill floor 24 hours a day. 
A common concern related to regulator use of real-time data monitoring for drilling 
event detection is the in-house technical competence and experience to properly manage 
and interpret the required data. Government inspectors and petroleum engineers do not 
have the operational opportunity provided by oil and gas operators. Additionally financial 
compensation for such occupations within the government cannot rival that of the industry, 
and quite often better knowledge and experience follows the better salary (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2014). Within oil and gas industry real-time 
monitoring operations, in-house experience is developed over decades before a person is 
entrusted to then interpret real-time data streams. This expertise is challenging to come by, 
and as the largest portion of the industry expertise approaches retirement, replacing this 
talent will become even harder. The Big Crew Change will prove to challenge the industry 
in replacing old expertise with new personnel in frontiers that are accelerating in difficulty 
and complexity at a rapid pace.   
In this sense, both industry and the government face a similar serious challenge: 
accelerating the learning curve and maximizing experience in a short time period. In part 
motivated by the future loss of much industry experience, efforts in recent years have been 
undertaken to implement artificial intelligence to aid in monitoring well data. Using an 
approach such as case-based reasoning (CBR), knowledge and experience can be digitally 
captured from trouble scenarios, stored, and retained for future use in new wells. 
Currently, oil and gas RTOCs rely heavily on highly skilled and experienced 






in the oil and gas industry, they have retained a great base of knowledge upon which to 
draw.  When even the slightest inflection on a data stream occurs, they can recall a 
situation that occurred in the past that had a similar behavior. They can then reason how 
closely a past experience matches the current scenario, diagnose the problem, and attempt 
mitigation. The person draws upon recollections of past experiences to handle new 
situations.  
Case-based reasoning is essentially the use of intelligent computer systems to 
emulate human reasoning (Gunderson et al., 2011). The basic application of CBR is “to 
identify the current problem situation, find a past case similar to the new one, use that case 
to suggest a solution to the current problem, evaluate the proposed solution, and update the 
system by learning from this experience (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994). As seen in Figure 4.11, 
the general steps in the process are (Aamodt and Plaza, 1994): 
1. Retrieve the most similar case or cases 
2. Reuse the information and knowledge in that case to solve the problem 
3. Revise the proposed solution 
4. Retain the parts of this experience likely to be useful for future problem solving 
 
By following this process, the program can be designed to mimic human learning 
experience. A new scenario is met with past experience, similarities are weighed, and 
intelligent decision support is provided based on the best available knowledge. This new 
‘case’ can then be stored in the case-base for future retention, essentially improving the 
knowledge and experience of the program. Just as a human has been trained and educated 






conditions faced in a problem is then tested. The more a person is challenged with new 
problems, the more experience a person will attain. The same is true for CBR programs, 
except that a CBR system continuously retains the stored experience whereas personnel 
change outs might vary the levels of expertise.  
Still a relatively young technology in the oil and gas industry, CBR is increasing in 
visibility and credibility. It has been employed in the industry to identify symptoms of 
adverse conditions in the drilling process to then diagnose or predict a problem (van Oort 
and Brady, 2011, Raja et al., 2011). The CBR system used in this research employed 
symptom detection “agents.” These agents are developed algorithms that utilize well 
characteristics with universal relationships in well symptoms. Once an agent successfully 
identifies a symptom to a drilling problem, it is presented as an event (e.g. flowback, max 
torque) (Gunderson and Shokouhi, 2012). As real-time data is transmitted, agents 
continuously monitor and interpret the data and flag events (Gunderson and Shokouhi, 
2012). The CBR program uses the accumulation of events to then search the case base for 
similarities in the current symptoms to any stored case. If there is a similarity, the stored 
case is then displayed along with a percentage of similarity to the current scenario. Each 
stored case provides a summary of the actions taken in that particular instance, the detailed 
outcome, and any recommended actions for similar cases in the future. If the current 
scenario becomes increasingly similar to a certain stored case, recommendations in the 
historical case can be employed to avoid the same problem. While performance 
improvement usually leads to improved safety, a current primary motivator for employing 
CBR is the reduction of NPT. However, this technology can also be effectively used for 






NPT incidents can also be contributing factors to losses of well control and blowouts. 
Among others, this software is currently capable of identifying events related to stuck pipe, 
pore pressure change, and lost circulation using primarily surface data. An additional 
advantage to using an artificial intelligence system such as this is the ability for quick 
reference to a likely solution to the suspected problem with the well (Gunderson and 
Shokouhi, 2012). Depending on the experience of the drilling engineer, a fast response to 
a time critical problem may not occur; however, similar historical events being presented 
by the system provide a quick and ready guide for mitigating actions (Gunderson and 
Shokouhi, 2012).  
Assuming the regulator has less expertise in the area of data interpretation, CBR 
could aid in accelerating this learning curve. Additionally, if a CBR system is automated 
to notify regulators of a potential incident, there is not necessarily a need for the regulator 








Figure 4.11: The case-based reasoning cycle applied to drilling (from Gunderson et al., 
2011). 
The challenge with monitoring real-time drilling data is that every well is unique.  
Fixed alarm parameters for one well will be of no relevance to a different well. In fact, 
those parameters may not even be relevant for the next section of hole being drilled. 
However, there are certain universal relationships between well characteristics that can be 
applied to most wells, if not every well, to detect symptomatic conditions (van Oort and 
Brady, 2011). Additionally monitoring data trends and ensuring proper context are much 
more valuable than just spot-checking data points. Trend measurements such as mechanical 
specific energy (MSE), d-exponent, flowback fingerprinting, and surface pressures provide 
an adaptable approach to monitoring and improving drilling performance and safety. 






it was placed into the context that it should be expected to be decreasing, and three minutes 
earlier it was 1,210 psi (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). Understanding the 
relationship that a less dense fluid is displacing a heavier fluid should be decreasing the 
standpipe pressure reading is one that a trained eye could analyze in the data, if that trained 
eye is continuously monitoring the data and has the proper situational awareness. The 
above example, taken straight from the Macondo blowout, was a trend that was not 
identified, even with personnel on board that were likely experienced enough to identify 
the problem. Contributing confusion around the well conditions such as bladder effect, an 
incorrectly confirmed negative pressure test, simultaneous operations of transferring tanks 
and discharging overboard, all led to not having the proper context of the situation 
(Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011). Well condition relationships and data trends are 
relatively simple to develop and implement in a CBR system and the symptomatic 
conditions in the Macondo incident would be easy to recognize in a CBR system 
continuously monitoring data.   
Figure 4.12 shows historical data analyzed by the CBR software. According to 
drilling reports, a stuck pipe event was experienced at approximately 9:00 am. As seen, 
events are flagged prior to the pipe becomes stuck and indicates such as the pipe has been 
identified as stuck in the hole. As shown in Figure 3.1, stuck pipe is a contributing factor 
in approximately 10 percent of blowout events. It may prove to be very challenging to 
identify symptoms that caused this event prior to its occurrence, particularly to the less 
experienced eye. However, referring to Figure 4.13, the CBR “radar” identified these 
symptoms much earlier. The radar indicates the magnitude of the current drilling state’s 






and the center being 100 percent similarity. In this instance, a stuck pipe case appeared on 
the CBR radar approximately 8 hours prior to the incident. This sort of “prediction” reflects 
previous experiences with this CBR software (van Oort and Brady, 2011, Raja et al., 2011). 
This technology could be valuable in aiding to identify symptomatic conditions of potential 




Figure 4.12: Drilling data analyzed by the CBR software, flagging events symptomatic of 
a stuck pipe case. As can be seen just before 9:00 am, hookload spikes with 
little block position movement, with additional symptoms of pressure spike 
and high torque leads. It can be observed that minutes before the stuck pipe 








Figure 4.13: The CBR radar showing the initial appearance of a stuck pipe case 
approximately 8 hours before the stuck pipe incident occurred. 
In addition to CBR, there have been developments in more focused areas of 
anomaly identification. For the purposes of this research, the primary adverse event 
detection needed for improved safety regulation is influx detection. Multiple well 
symptoms from real-time data can be utilized to verify a suspected fluid influx. For kick 
detection, commonly monitored parameters are the mud pit volume, return mud flow or 
mud flow out of the well, and standpipe pressure, all taken from sensors at surface 






drilling fluid flowing out of the well should equal the volume of fluid that was pumped into 
the well. In the case of a kick, expected responses would be a gain in pit volume, increased 
return flow, and a decreased standpipe pressure (Anfinsen and Rommetveit, 1992). Due to 
the continuing trend of drilling deeper wells and the compressibility of commonly utilized 
synthetic- or oil-based muds in deepwater, the ability to manually identify positive kick 
symptoms in a timely manner is complicated. Too much time transpiring between influx 
and identification can result in a lengthy and costly kill operation, sidetracks, or even total 
loss of the well. Thus, there is opportunity for more automated approach to utilize real-
time data in identifying provides a much closer watch on time critical information. 
 
Some work has been done to develop early kick detection using what is known as 
flowback fingerprinting (Ali et al., 2013). By fingerprinting the change in volume in the 
mud pits, particularly during connections when there is no flow into the well, a method can 
be developed to determine whether or not the well is taking a kick. Fluid flowback after 
shutting off mud pumps is typically expected to be between 20 and 50 barrels, usually 
displaying a “repeatable profile” in the data (Ali et al., 2013). Thus, this repeatable profile 
can be “fingerprinted” and repeatedly compared to the new flowback data of the well. In 
deepwater applications, weak formations may display wellbore “ballooning” or 
“breathing,” where drilling fluid is actually opening fractures into the formations. Once the 
dynamic pressure from the pumps is shut off, the formation returns the volume of drilling 
fluid back to the well, observed as a gain in the mud pits. It is important to be able to 
differentiate between wellbore breathing and kicks, as improper diagnosis could lead to 






leading to uncontrolled fracture propagation, lost circulation, and potentially a real kick. 
Wellbore breathing can also be differentiated by an automated system through 
fingerprinting. Figure 4.14 shows real-time data from a well being monitored by an RTOC 
and the use of flowback fingerprinting to appropriately identify anomalous flowback and 
differentiate between breathing and a kick. However, when analyzing the kick flowback in 
Figure 4.14, it should be noted that it takes just short of six minutes to visually identify a 
significant deviation from the previous fingerprints.  
 
 
Figure 4.14: Flowback fingerprinting performed by RTOC personnel in order to identify 
anomalous well flow (from van Oort et al., 2005). 
By using an intelligent process, kicks could be identified much more quickly, 
leaving a larger window for reaction time and minimizing safety impacts. Work has been 
done to automate the flowback fingerprinting process in real-time, statistically analyzing 






not detected by manual alarm settings, resulting in 31 days of NPT (Ali et al., 2013). This 
data set was then run through an automated smart flowback fingerprinting program (Ali et 
al., 2013). By maintaining a continuous running average of flowback response and 
comparing that to the current state, limitations were set within one standard deviation of 
the running average, resulting in abnormal flowback detection within one minute of 
monitoring (Ali et al., 2013). Expanding the window to two standard deviations was also 
successful in identifying abnormal flowback in a relatively short time (Ali et al., 2013). 
With the development of a simple intelligent relationship, an automated detect process was 




Figure 4.15: Automated flowback fingerprinting identifying abnormal flowback within 






While flow and volume parameters are frequently used in kick detection efforts, 
these data readings can be subject to much variation due to the quality of the sensors, or as 
seen in the Macondo blowout, simultaneous operations. Another method in early kick 
detection avoids the dependence on analyzing flow and utilizes real-time pressure readings 
at surface (Reitsma, 2010, Reitsma 2011, Mills et al., 2012). Primarily tested with dynamic 
annular pressure control managed pressure drilling (MPD), the use of standpipe and 
annular discharge pressures and their relationship has proven to be an effective method in 
kick detection, applicable to conventional drilling methods as well (Reitsma, 2010). As had 
already been demonstrated, standpipe pressure is a reliable parameter for identification, but 
additional validation is required. While ultimately downhole data provided by PWD would 
give the most accurate information for detection of influxes, current downhole data 
telemetry such as mud-pulse telemetry has limitations. Due to the amount of data collected 
downhole and limited bandwidth capability, a relatively long span of time can transpire 
before pressure readings are relayed to surface. Additionally, during connections when 
there is now fluid flow, data cannot be transmitted.  
Typically, as previously mentioned, flow and volume data of drilling fluid is 
utilized to verify influx. However, it has been proven that using sensor data from annular 
discharge pressure provides comparable results in detecting influxes with significant lower 
cost (Reitsma, 2011). Additionally, with respect to limited deck space on offshore rigs, 
pressure sensors require significantly less space than flow sensing equipment such as 
Coriolis flow meters and are not as sensitive to conditions such as two phase flow (Reitsma, 
2010). Figure 4.16 shows the similar trend in kick detection between monitoring annular 






kick detection method shows positive results in its capability to detect influxes in a 
relatively short period of time. 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Comparison of change in fluid flow rate (Delta Flow) and annular discharge 
















Beyond the employment of real-time data for improved regulatory oversight, there 
are organizational challenges that the regulatory agencies must overcome for more 
effective oversight. The exhaustive attempts to keep rulemaking from lagging too far 
behind the rapid advancement of technology, compounded with the struggle to hire and 
retain personnel exposes the need for agencies to be capable of doing “more with less” with 
regards to in-house knowledge and expertise. 
5.1 CASE FOR ACTION 
Always present in rulemaking is the debate to identify what is too prescriptive 
versus what might be too “laissez-faire.” It’s certainly understood that the majority of 
people are simply trying to do their job the best they know how. In some cases regulation 
can be left to goal-based incentives, while at other times rules need to be more prescriptive. 
It is frequently perceived that the regulator is an enemy to industry and more than anything 
just gets in the way of efficiency. The reality is that the offshore oil and gas industry is 
regulated, and there are cases in which violations of safety occur. Another reality is that 
industry harnesses the vast majority of experience and knowledge on virtually any subject 
that might be regulated offshore. For truly effective regulation the two entities, industry 
and regulators, must work together. The same is true for standards. While this is a slightly 
different dynamic, it is vital for all parties to participate in identifying best practices.  
There are three areas that impact the effectiveness of regulation: 






 Personnel staffing and retention. 
 Personnel knowledge and experience. 
 
Development of safety rules can be a lengthy process. For example, some of the 
regulations inspired by Macondo, an incident of much significance, were not finalized until 
years after the blowout. Likewise standards can experience the same sort of lag time.  
Certainly standards and regulations should not be developed and implemented hastily, but 
certain avenues within KM can facilitate more timely development and possibly ensure 
more effective methods of compliance. 
BSEE continues to be challenged by a lack of personnel staffing and retention.  It 
is no secret that the industry is currently undergoing a boom. Likewise industry salaries are 
reflecting that as well. In a 2014 audit performed by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO), officials within BSEE, the Bureau of Offshore Environmental Management 
(BOEM), and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), were surveyed regarding employee 
hiring and retention. One of the primary difficulties in hiring and retention of personnel 
referenced was the difference between industry and federal salaries (Figure 5.1) (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2014). In an attempt to address workforce issues after 
the Macondo blowout, Congress approved funding for BSEE to increase Gulf of Mexico 
unsupervised inspector positions to more than twice the amount at the time of the incident 
in 2010, from 52 to 129 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014). However, by 
October 2012 BSEE had only increased its inspector workforce to 71 (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2014). Figure 5.2 provides an insightful look into the effects of an 






a different perspective. Being a military service, offshore regulators are frequently rotated 
out and transferred every few years, often to offices that have no involvement in OCS 
regulation. As far as personnel demand, the OCS regulatory mission for the USCG is a 
relatively small piece of the larger puzzle of the multi-mission service. Very few personnel 
are employed for OCS regulation, thus the loss of one person due to rotation can have a 
large impact. 
The challenges of hiring and retention quite frequently impact the agencies’ in-
house knowledge and experience. As noted in the GAO audit, “top applicants are typically 
hired by the petroleum industry, leaving Interior [BSEE] with less-skilled applicants.” 
Thus, regulators are doubly challenged to effectively perform duties understaffed and with 
typically less knowledgeable individuals compared to the industry bodies being regulated.  
To make the issue more challenging, the attrition rate of BSEE inspectors is above the 
Federal Government average (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2014), assuming 
trained personnel are leaving the bureau for industry jobs. Additionally in the forecast, over 
30 percent of BSEE petroleum engineers will be retirement eligible by 2017 (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2014). Considering all of these conditions, BSEE has 
a formidable task of ensuring it maximizes its management of in-house talent and captures 
personnel experience before it may be lost. The USCG again has a similar challenge in that 
OCS regulatory personnel are sparse and spread thin geographically. In addition, most 
USCG inspectors are not strictly dedicated to OCS regulation, thus the knowledge is one 
of a many required skills for job performance. Providing an easily navigable network to 








Figure 5.1: The trend in salaries (average) of oil and gas related specialties in industry 




Figure 5.2: Causes and effects of insufficient regulatory workforce hiring and retention 







The traditional paradigm for both agencies’ inspections is the use of paper 
checklists that are then documented and archived electronically. Additionally the same can 
be said for incident investigations. Everything is performed on paper, then electronically 
documented. Some analyses of these statistics are performed that provide some beneficial 
use to focusing inspections or communicated common non-compliances. However there 
are available knowledge management capabilities that could significantly advance the use 
of such data, catapulting agencies and industry into a much more effective use of the 
information at hand. This topic is explored in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.  
5.2 DEFINITION 
Knowledge management (KM) often is interpreted in many different forms. In its 
truest form the focus of KM is the ability to capture, share and improve organizational 
knowledge within an organization or between organizations. It is key to align KM not only 
with and organization’s internal strategy but also with its day-to-day business activities. 
When implementing correct KM a wide range of concepts are addressed related to 
knowledge capture and sharing. These include concepts such as information management, 
data management, virtual working and organizational collaboration.  
Each of these elements though not considered to be KM are key to provide 
foundational elements to create the right environment to share. For example, if information 
is not correctly managed, the right information would not be shared which would render 
sharing itself moot. If the foundational quality of information is ensured then the 
organization puts itself in a position to share and build on this knowledge. Five main areas 







 People and Culture  
 Technology  
 Process 
 Compliance 
Not all of these elements are considered enablers for KM. Some may be blockers but need 
to be addressed to have a successful KM implementation.  
5.3 CONTEXT 
When it comes to implementing a knowledge solution, context is everything. If one 
is looking to improve the knowledge of a team, organization or company, the context in 
which the entity operates must be understood. For example, with the regulatory 
environment, elements such as the agency’s mandate, focus, and long term vision must be 
properly understood. Also, the collaborative environment in which the agency works 
related to partners, customers and support elements, must be understood.  
Once full insight is attained regarding the context of an organization’s KM needs, 
key factors can be identified for enhanced collaboration and sharing. 
5.4 PEOPLE 
The biggest challenge for any KM initiative is the change element, the ability to 
change behaviors within the organization and to the outside world. Change management 
should not be taken lightly especially within the regulatory environment. Many years of 
set behaviors and beliefs live within the organization which would need to be changed to 
embrace an improved sharing culture. Within KM, creating a sharing and learning 






can take 3-5 years. This is not only focused on the existing staff but enabling the change 
within new staff as they are brought on board.   
5.5 TECHNOLOGY 
Selecting the right technology to support and enable the KM initiative is often 
critical. The biggest mistake many organizations make, however, is that technology is seen 
as the only enabler of change. Cultural change is often more important than the 
technologies implemented. That being said, it is vital to employ technologies that are easily 
understood and require a minimal learning curve. If large amounts of time are needed to 
train staff on the technology, it quickly becomes a burden and will lose organizational 
support for implementation. When selecting the right technological tools, another 
important factor is integration. It is not useful to have multiple tools that do not work in an 
integrated fashion. This too can alienate organizational staff and prevent new concepts 
from being adopted.  
5.6 PROCESS 
Process management is often mistaken for KM. Since many organizations have 
corporate processes and workflows, enabling change is seen to be a process. Though 
process is important and helpful from an enforcement mechanism it shouldn’t be confused 
with enabling a sharing environment. Process should always be in support of describing 
how people work together, but more importantly, should be making sure that people are 
willing to collaborate. In practice, if a process is forced rather than having personnel 
display the willingness to collaborate, the result will be very different. If an activity is 






If personnel are invested and wanting to do an activity, consequently better value results 
will be produced. For example personnel are asked to share their experiences, it will likely 
result in open and honest feedback. If it is dictated they must share at least once a month, 
they will collaborate but purely as a “check the box” exercise. 
5.7 COMPLIANCE 
One might find it strange to see compliance in a knowledge sharing model, but it 
becomes important when it might block knowledge sharing initiatives. Many knowledge 
sharing initiatives fail or are halted due to compliance. What starts out as a great idea and 
initiative can easily be slowed down if compliance is not addressed early in the KM 
program. Compliance in this context means where focus is needed on information security, 
records management compliance and any export of information limitations.  
5.8 APPLICATION AREAS 
In this section, the focus is on key enablers for knowledge sharing. Some of these 
might not be considered pure knowledge capture and sharing but certainly help to reach 
out and create an improved platform for collaboration. The concepts discuss in the 
following sections have been identified which would be of the most value based on a 
collaboration maturity model in Figure 5.3. This model has been developed after extensive 
KM experience with major offshore oil and gas operations. The maturity model is meant 
as a method to identify areas of improvement. Each box defines the maturity level of 








Figure 5.3 The collaboration maturity model. Highlighted areas (white) are concepts 
believed to have the greatest potential impact on offshore regulation KM. 
5.8.1 Knowledge Capture 
In KM there are two sides to knowledge: explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit 
knowledge is knowledge or information that is documented and captured. Tacit knowledge 
is the experience in people’s minds.  
When focusing on knowledge capture, it is desired to capture and share tacit 
knowledge to a wider audience. There are many ways to enable knowledge capture. 
Traditionally knowledge capture would be done through structured interviews after which 






recently knowledge capture has moved to embrace social media concepts such as 
Wikipedia, video lessons learned and storytelling. 
Wikipedia within an organization is becoming more and more important to share 
information. An example of this is the SPE’s PetroWiki. SPE has transferred its 
engineering handbooks to an electronic, web-based Wiki site. The primary motivator in 
this venture is the ability to provide focused content to users without having to provide 
large paper manuals. Also, this provides the opportunity to have multiple people involved 
in updating the content year-round and to provide information in context when it is needed. 
In fact, the USCG has already seen a grassroots movement in establishing a marine 
inspections and investigations Wiki (Figure 5.4). This knowledge capture tool was 
established and is still managed by USCG inspectors for inspectors. While an extremely 










Figure 5.4: The USCG marine inspections and investigations Wiki (from The Virtual 
Bullpen). The “Virtual Bullpen” is a knowledge capture tool where all USCG 
inspectors and investigators can provide input and experience regarding 
various sections of regulatory requirements and USCG inspector and 
investigator qualifications. 
Video lessons learned are considered an extension to traditional after action reviews 
(AAR). AARs are used to capture learning after an activity or audit is performed. AARs 
include the following main elements:  
 What was the intent? 
 What actually happened? 
 What could be improved? 
 What will we do different next time? 







This is a very powerful tool originally used by the U.S. Army and has made its 
transition into the oil and gas industry. As learnings are captured through reviews, anything 
that can be documented through short video lessons can aid future personnel in applied 
learning. With new technologies, it is now possible to utilize voice recognition and index 
information provided within videos. This makes finding a section regarding specific 
information in a video easy to retrieve.   
Within an organizational environment, applying Wiki provides the ability to show 
relevant, contextual information based on intelligent search recommendations. An example 
of a new technology that enables this is semantic recommendation. Semantic 
recommendations use factors such as context, location, and information needs and provide 
content (be it Wikis or documents) relevant to a specific problem. Semantics can also be 
used to track new technology concepts in oil and gas through advantage external indexing 
of third party material.  
When it comes to capturing lessons and sharing them, it has been found that the use 
of stories vs. reports often help to drive a better, more simply understood lesson. By 
interviewing seasoned professionals and capturing their stories, it provides an easy and 
effective vehicle for new staff to understand issues and challenges. Throughout time a story 
often does bring more context and appreciation for why things should happen or be 
operated in a certain way. The so-called storytelling methods have started to become 
popular within the oil and gas industry, and combined with video, provide an effective 







A valuable application of knowledge capture is data collected by the regulatory 
organizations around HSE incidents. Data captured from these investigations can then be 
utilized to analyze commonly occurring incidents and anticipate needs for regulatory and 
standards development or modification. This will help ensure lower incident and a pro-
active focus on safety based on regulatory captured information.   
5.8.2 Knowledge Sharing 
Once knowledge is captured, it is ready to be shared. Sharing knowledge can be 
done in many different ways, but the primary mechanism is through so called Communities 
of Practice (CoP). A CoP is a group of people who share a common goal or interest 
collaborating together to supply knowledge to each other. Many oil and gas companies are 
actively employing CoPs. When implementing CoPs, it is important to have organizational 
support for knowledge sharing and a strong focus on enabling behavior change. To move 
from ad hoc email discussions to structured conversation can be a challenge. A new 
development in this area is to leverage social media as a collaboration platform. The 
reasoning behind this is that one can easily exploit mobile collaboration. Additionally, 
training needs are lower due to it being relatively easy to use, and the concept is already 
understood by most if not all users. When developing new concepts and innovation, the 
use of crowdsourcing and idea brainstorming has become popular. New innovations often 
come from a collaboration of various parties including operators, service companies, 
government, standards organizations, and universities to bring a wide range of experience 







CoPs together with Wiki and knowledge capture become very powerful in sharing 
ideas and capturing lessons. Once someone has shared and discussed a specific issue it is 
important to close the loop on the discussion to capture conclusions. This is where the use 
of Wikis becomes a powerful learning mechanism for organizations.  
Although sharing knowledge within a CoP is important, other applications can be 
of value when focusing on social collaboration. CoPs certainly can become of great value 
to promote dialogue between all involved parties in the development of new rules. Social 
collaboration would ensure that ideas are not trapped in strings of email conversations. 
Instead, any party that may be new to the dialogue can refer to the history and provide input 
as needed. The social collaboration area becomes the central conduit of information and 
discourse. Secondly, emails can become obtrusive mixed with routine day to day email 
communications. A more efficient way to handle these conversations is by leveraging 
social collaboration where all communications are stored and separated through an app on 
a mobile device. Another example, which is interrelated to the virtual collaboration section, 
is in the CBR automated alerting software or any applications that create email alerting 
(Figure 5.5). Traditionally, when alerts are generated in an application these are sent 
through email. Again, emails can become mixed with more routine correspondence. The 
concept would be that an alert is sent into a collaboration space and any parties associated 
or “tagged” in this space can, in a virtual environment, discuss the course of action and a 








Figure 5.5: The implementation of an app-based social collaboration tool for standards 
and regulation development, as well as real-time alerts, could provide a more 
efficient means of addressing challenges and involving all necessary parties 
in real-time collaboration. 
5.8.3 Virtual Collaboration 
A final focus area in KM is the ability to leverage intelligent technologies to reduce 
dependence on deploying personnel out in the field and share information more effectively 
in real-time. This includes technologies focused on: 
 Mobile technology 
 Real-time alerting 
 Augmented reality 
 Remote drone support 
 
Mobile technology and specifically technology that is overall intrinsically safe on 
the rig to enable individual personnel are an interesting development in the oil and gas 






1/Division 1 specifications, preventing ignition of hydrocarbons that might be present. This 
provides users with the ability to share information in the field to and from the rig floor. 
An example where mobile technology could help is through live streaming from the rig 
(Figure 5.6). Video can be streamed from any cameras on the rig and from the intrinsically 
safe devices to the office or other locations.  
 
 
Figure 5.6: An example of the use of mobile technology for remote oversight, utilizing 
an intrinsically safe mobile device that can be taken anywhere on the rig 
without ignition risk (from Mobile Smart Worker Solutions). 
This helps to reduce the need for deploying office staff to the field for on-site 
compliance and quality assurance inspections, as any personnel on the rig can use the 
device to show any equipment that needs to be inspected.  
Another developing technology is augmented reality. A comparable example of this 
technology would be Google Glass. An augmented reality environment gives the user the 






on a rig and relevant information and instructions can overlaid on top of the camera view. 
This is a great way to train and teach new staff how to perform specific actions in the field. 
Finally, while having an intrinsically safe device on the rig, there is always the 
capability to leverage other remote concepts such as inspection drones on each of the rigs. 
Although currently more on the outer periphery of recommendations to be considered for 
adoption, this could eventually help reduce personnel work time and physical presence in 
hazardous environments.  
5.9 APPLICATION TO BSEE AND USCG CHALLENGES 
Referring back to the presented challenges for BSEE and USCG KM, many of the 
above-mentioned concepts can be applied to help address these agencies’ knowledge gaps 
and ultimately improve performance in oversight. 
5.9.1 Timely Development of Sound Regulations and Standards 
The first area of focus when it comes to regulation and standards creation and 
development is actually understanding and tracking changes in new developments. It can 
be a challenge to keep pace with new technologies and associated standards application in 
the industry. An example of this time gap is the maturation and implementation of manage 
pressure and dual-gradient drilling (MPD/DGD) technologies without timely development 
of rules or standards. While a simple concept, MPD/DGD technologies push the technical 
envelope further than what the industry thought possible. However, application is relatively 
complex compared to conventional techniques. Thus, a vacuum in standards around such 
technology leaves both the regulator and industry with a sound guideline or rule for safe 






development changes can be tracked in specific areas of technology, and standards and 
regulatory bodies can be made aware in advance to start work on any associated 
requirements (Figure 5.7). Through use of technology that understands and interprets the 
information through natural language processing, organizations have the ability to flag 
relevant information rather than having to sift through long laundry lists of non-applicable 
information. This capability is currently being applied by an oil and gas operator in order 
to track new developments and innovations in deepwater technology.  
Once the areas of importance around which standards development is needed 
become clear, the experience within the organization must certainly be leveraged, but even 
more so experience from within the industry must be tapped. This is where professional 
organization communities of practice come into play, such as API, SPE, IADC, etc. These 
organizations, if able to participate with the regulatory organizations, can provide insight 
into any other innovations and can help problem solve what standards development would 
be best.  
The advantage in leveraging these communities is to make use of the large 
membership and still be able to track the conversations. Again, the use of a semantic-based 
search engine to index these communities and provide recommendations becomes 
important.  
After employing the industry CoPs for scope and direction, the actual creation and 
deployment of a standard becomes very important. Rather than updating one large 
document being printed and sent to organizations, utilizing Wiki’s in such a way that 
specific sections can be edited and are more frequently and easily able to provide in-context 






reference page. As the professional organizations also are moving towards Wiki this can 
be used for reference as well. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: An example of the use of semantic intelligence. In this case, a search was 
performed for dual gradient drilling. From this, much information is brought 
to the fingertips of the user, including definitions, methods, even trends in 







The advantage in leveraging these communities is to make use of the large 
membership and still be able to track the conversations. Again, the use of a semantic based 
search engine to index these communities and provide recommendations becomes 
important. After employing the industry CoPs for scope and direction, the actual creation 
and deployment of a standard becomes very important. Rather than updating one large 
document being printed and sent to organizations, Wiki’s can be used in such a way that 
specific sections can be edited and  are more frequently and easily able to provide in-
context material to the industry (e.g. one has no need to send a whole guide but just a 
specific reference page). As the professional organizations also are moving towards Wiki 
this can be used for reference as well. 
5.9.2 Personnel Staffing and Retention 
As there is a limit on staffing, and no one can be everywhere at the same time, it 
becomes important to be able to leverage experience and connections between the 
regulatory staff. In this way, one person need not know all the answers, and a network of 
personnel can actually support multiple companies and assets at one time. This becomes 
easier through the use of mobile technology where reviews can happen through rig-safe 
devices and remote communication can happen together with video back to the shore, 
including from the rig floor. Either deployed regulators can relay questions or concerns 
back to shore for additional input, or the rig can relay information back to the regulators 
on shore, all in real-time. Combine this with a drone on the rig that can be steered remotely 
by the reviewer this becomes a very powerful tool and cuts down on not only manpower 






Drone technology has been successfully applied in the United Kingdom with 
various offshore oil and gas companies. Though the application of this technology is still 
under review within the U.S. it is expected that in 2015 clarity will be provided to the use 
of drone technology in U.S. airspace. Once regulation regarding commercial drones is 
implemented in U.S. airspace, it can be anticipated that commercial drone usage on 
offshore installations will become a commonplace inspection tool from the industry 
perspective, removing personnel from harm’s way. Regulators should be prepared to 
embrace this technology as a means to enhance remote inspection capabilities. An example 
of this might be a supply vessel allision with a tension leg platform. Upon notification, 
regulators could remotely witness the extent of structural damage suffered and determine 
response/investigation needs before planning and procuring a costly helicopter flight. 
Though augmented reality is becoming more applicable in the industry it will take 
a significant effort to relate this to the wide range of diverse rigs and environments. 
However, once this has been done being able to pull up specifics on any technology on the 
rig makes it a very powerful tool.  
5.9.3 Personnel Knowledge and Experience 
As there is a limit on experienced personal every opportunity must be taken to share 
knowledge of more experienced staff. When implementing video capture, interviews can 
be a powerful way to capture knowledge even of staff leaving the organization or retiring.  
By providing a video-on-demand library that can be accessed out in the field, learning can 
be accelerated. This is important especially for younger staff coming in who are much more 






compelling and help create a bond between the experienced staff and new hires so the use 
of stories creates a stronger bond and makes a lesson harder to forget.  
Finally, by embedding AAR’s into the daily routine a library of experience becomes 
available for current and future staff. This is important to build a routine around this with 
new staff so it become second nature on every activity done. An example of how to apply 
the AARs is to have a regular meeting virtual or together where each of the field personnel 
can highlight challenges in the field. By performing AAR’s and capturing the learnings 
and actions, the distribution of knowledge will be accelerated.  
5.10 RECOMMENDED KM APPROACH 
When it comes to the implementation of solutions in the Knowledge management 
space, the five focus areas and their associated key activities would be utilized. In 
implementing the various knowledge concepts previously described, specific questions 
should be asked relevant to each concept. Appendix A1 provides a checklist has been 
provided as an example for mobile technology implementation. KM provides a most cost-
effective avenue to ensuring timely development of worthwhile standards and regulations 
and promotes an all-encompassing inclusion of expertise. However, as with any 
implementation of new concepts, they must be strategically introduced so as to have the 
optimum cultural acceptance. Therefore, this thesis recommends a three phase approach to 
regulatory agencies in implementing KM concepts. 
5.10.1 Phase I 
The first phase of KM concepts implementation addresses ideas that can most easily 






 Wiki – The fastest way to embrace Wiki concepts and its value is to focus on 
information within standards that are repeatedly used in the field. By separating 
these sections into an easily retrievable Wiki the ability to react to specific standard 
activities is accelerated. This would be a fast easy win to do within the regulatory 
organizations. Members within the USCG have taken an important first step in 
developing a Wiki for this purpose, however, much can be done to further foster 
and develop this capability, particularly related to offshore regulation. Also, 
integrating BSEE and its respective knowledge within a Wiki will improve 
knowledge capture and sharing in both camps. 
 Semantics – By leveraging technologies that already have pre-indexed multiple 
sources relating to technology (SPE, IEEE, global patents) together with semantic 
intelligence the knowledge on new concepts will become easily and readily 
available. This will give the regulators clear insight into the range and concepts out 
in the industry vs. waiting to be educated or have to self-discover the range of 
regulatory implications. This can easily be done now through online subscription 
services.  
 Lessons Learned – Initiating a lessons learned initiative is reasonably straight 
forward. By including this in a weekly close out practice even between two field 
staff, the learning and capture can quickly create a valuable reference library of 
lessons. Many times best results are seen when veteran personnel are paired with 






5.10.2 Phase II 
To one extent or another, second phase concepts involve a greater degree of either 
infrastructure development or cultural transition. 
 Storytelling – Recording experiences of knowledgeable/transitioning personnel 
provides a user-friendly interface to learn from past challenges. Many times, 
particularly with geographical challenges, different regulatory offices of the same 
organization might come to different conclusions. However, the implementation of 
storytelling can provide an additional element of experience to help provide 
uniformity in regulation. Once developed and adopted, storytelling archives can be 
rolled into the organization Wiki. 
 Collaboration space/CoPs – CoPs can provide a significant advantage in taking 
input in policy/regulation/standard development from multiple parties identified as 
having integral experience and value in the industry. However, a significant cultural 
barrier must be overcome both internally and externally. While still maintaining 
enforcement bounds, regulatory and industry parties must begin to look at each 
other from the perspective of being collaborators together in an effort to ensure 
safe, efficient delivery of offshore wells. Additionally, regulatory agencies must 
foster a more cooperative and participatory relationship with sister agencies (e.g. 
between USCG and BSEE) and utilize CoPs to maximize understanding of 
responsibilities and collaboration. 
 Mobile Technology – Mobile technology could be seen as a far-fetched concept for 
regulatory purposes, but the world is in an accelerated transition to providing 






at a far distance offshore provide a good example of how regulators can benefit 
from having instantaneous access to regulations, standards, electronic checklists, 
Wikis, lessons learned, storytelling videos, collaboration space, and even video chat 
for supplemental support and better on-site decision-making. Simply put, 
intrinsically safe mobile technology can be where KM capabilities all come 
together for the regulator. 
5.10.3 Phase III 
Third phase concepts focus on long-term implementation of new practices and 
procedures with sufficient cultural change. These represent technologies “on the horizon” 
– very powerful capabilities, but requiring more painstaking integration with corporate 
culture and development of new infrastructure. 
 Real-time Alerting – In reality, real-time alerting technology is akin to a phase II 
concept. The idea of real-time alerting could be implemented with relative ease; 
however, the complication is what the alerting is actually linked to. In this context, 
real-time alerting associated with drilling events requires the acceptance and 
development of an infrastructure utilizing artificial intelligence, such as CBR, and 
subsequently linking such alerts to a collaboration space.   
 Drone Support – Dependent on future regulatory requirements, the forecast is 
promising for employment of drone support by the offshore industry in the Gulf of 
Mexico. However, offshore regulators may be far from developing policy relying 
on such technology to supplement or augment inspection criteria. 
 Augmented Reality – Augmented reality provides a clear opportunity into 






By having the ability to visualize past hot spots at a glance on a mobile device not 
only highlights areas of focus but teaches new staff what past experience has 
captured as relevant. For regulators, having this capability directly tied to incident 
and non-compliance statistics, even as particular as a specific rig history, can help 
ensure the hot spots do not go overlooked. Extensive infrastructure would need to 
be established for this technology to be implemented in the future, but could 
provide significant value to offshore safety. 
 
As the current offshore climate seems to forecast that the industry will continue to 
increase its deepwater (and eventually Arctic) presence and develop more remotely located 
offshore fields, regulatory agencies will need to keep pace with the trend. The furthering 
of field development in harsher conditions will also push the need for advanced 
technological methods for more efficient and safer performance. In order to avoid lagging 
behind appropriately overseeing and regulating these changes in the industry, agencies will 
need to maximally exploit their in-house expertise as well as collaborative industry, non-














Recommendations and Future Work 
A case has been presented here that currently available real-time data acquisition 
and monitoring technologies can be employed by the regulator to the benefit of offshore 
safety and compliance. It has been shown that a regulator monitoring data can witness 
required tests throughout the entire well construction process from the convenience of a 
computer virtually anywhere in the world. In real-time communication with the operator, 
drilling contractor, and involved service company, the regulator can identify key 
measurements that ensure that operations are being performed in accordance with what 
was proposed and approved.   
6.1 REAL-TIME DATA MONITORING REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
A significant hurdle in the implementation of such technology is that of 
promulgating regulation. Completely restructuring a regulatory regime is not an overnight 
change-out. However, if the currently regulatory regime were utilized with minimal 
introduction of new regulations, it might be more easily embraced and implemented. It 
should be clarified that the lines of responsibility should not be blurred when integrating 
the regulator into remote oversight. The objective is ensuring consistent, continuous 
compliance with already existing safety regulations and performance in accordance with 
the plan that has been vetted and approved. The operator is still ultimately responsible for 
decision-making regarding planning and execution of well construction; however, 






provide more continuous and informed oversight, but has the potential of providing a more 
efficient manner in regulating and performance. 
The current set of rules lends itself well to establishing requirements for providing 
regulators access to real-time data, particularly with respect to BOP, formation strength, 
and cementing/casing tests. In one form or another, information from these tests is already 
required to be provided upon request of the regulator. Providing access to real-time data 
could fit entirely within this requirement. However, in an effort to minimize the burden on 
companies to provide real-time data, what is the minimum data set needed to effectively 
regulate remotely with real-time data? Simply put, this type of regulation could be 
performed with data that most, if not all, deepwater operators already acquire for these 
tests.  Specifically, regulators would need to require, minimally: 
 Pump pressures 
 Volumes 
 Pump/Flow rates 
 Fluid densities (and corrections for downhole effects) 
 Standpipe pressure 
 Health monitoring on key equipment, e.g. BOPs 
 
The use of downhole pressure data would prove to benefit the accuracy of tests and 
ultimately the safety of well operations. However, the minimal set of data requirements 
could be attained from surface measurements. 
The subject of event detection could be expected to be a more challenging, but very 






written now, the regulations provide for a loose interpretation that could justify requirement 
of drilling event detection capabilities and regulator real-time data monitoring capability 
in accordance with the requirement to keep wells under control using BAST (30 CFR 
250.401). However, being that this requirement would necessarily require much more data 
on a more continuous basis, and would additionally bring with it the potential for 
interrupted operations, a clear expectation and procedure would need to be laid out. Also, 
the extent of drilling activities suitable/fit for oversight would need to be determined. The 
case-based reasoning software used in this research provides monitoring of not only pore 
pressure changes and losses of circulation, but many other NPT issues that could also be 
contributing factors to well control incidents. However, if the scope of oversight would just 
be limited to pore pressure/fracture gradient, and influx monitoring through flowback 
fingerprinting or SPP/ADP measurements, the data requirement would not be as 
substantial. At a minimum, automated influx monitoring employing technologies such as 
flowback fingerprinting and/or SPP/ADP should be implemented. These technologies only 
require provision of data that is already utilized for kick detection, which includes fluid 
flow rates, standpipe pressure, and mud pit volume (Ali et al., 2013). SPP/ADP, however, 
would require one additional pressure sensor somewhere along the annulus discharge line 
(Reitsma, 2011). These two capabilities alone could flag anomalous conditions, notify 
regulators of potential catastrophe, and allow them to contact the rig to ensure they are 
aware of the unsafe situation. It would still be up to rig personnel and their respective shore-
based leadership to determine the best and safest remedy to satisfy the regulator that it is 






With respect to case-based reasoning and related artificial intelligence/pattern 
recognition technologies, it is the opinion of the authors that this provides a very promising 
future in the industry as an automated, fairly objective monitoring system that can make its 
users safer and better drillers. This technology is the preview into the future of drilling and 
completions, and its advancement and maturity should be embraced by both regulators and 
industry as a very valuable aid to safer drilling operations. The application of the 
technology itself is very effective in its current state, but will become an even better asset 
in the future and also assist in maximizing learning experiences of regulators and drilling 
engineers.   
6.2 IMPLEMENTATION 
Like the phased approach outlined in the KM section, developing a regulatory 
structure for real-time data monitoring adoption would need to mirror such implementation 
and is recommended as such. This phased implementation could easily be trialed under the 
auspices of the OESI and COS, minimizing much overhead cost that would otherwise be 
shouldered independently by regulatory agencies. Additionally, these organizations 
coupled with academic partners could provide a “neutral party” testing ground, mitigating 
any concern regarding conflicts of interest. 
6.2.1 Phase I 
The first phase of implementation would necessarily be a small scale pilot program, 
utilizing already established infrastructure in a cooperative setting UT-Austin (a partner in 
the OESI) provides a unique opportunity in this partnership with its Remote Collaboration 






concurrently.  This facility is also “vendor neutral,” providing virtually any commonly 
employed data software in well design and execution. In this phase, basic implementation 
of essential tools would be undertaken, utilizing simpler softwares for real-time monitoring 
(BOPs, LOTs/FITs, casing, slurry placement, etc.). Real-time drilling data could also be 
visualized for purely educational purposes to begin grooming regulators to recognize 
suspect data patterns. This exercise in monitoring real-time data would, in reality, be in 
need of one or a few cooperating offshore operator(s) willing to provide real-time data and 
two way communications with the rig and operator’s RTOC. The overall goal of this phase 
would simply be proof of concept and staging for phase II. 
6.2.2 Phase II 
Upon proof of concept and validation in the value of regulatory real-time data 
monitoring, regulators would look to establish a small-scale, war room-like RTOC, 
implementing lessons learned and adopted software usage from phase I. An increase in 
data volume could be undertaken, soliciting for operator voluntary compliance. A goal-
based approach could be developed at this point. In response to satisfactory remote 
compliance via real-time data, regulators could trial the approach of decreasing onsite visits 
to rigs cooperating with voluntary compliance. Workflows could be matured as well as 
development and maturation of more defined rules and regulations. While utilizing the 
software implementations from phase I, more complex software such as CBR for drilling 
event detection/prediction, could be employed. This phase would validate independent 






6.2.3 Phase III 
Mature implementation of RTOC concepts would be adopted in phase III. 
Voluntary compliance would eventually transition to mandatory compliance with data 
provision for regulatory real-time data monitoring. Regulators would have real-time data 
monitoring covering all offshore operations, utilizing the matured software developments 
from previous phases. To accomplish this, agencies would need to establish one central 
RTOC. However, dependent on the number of offshore well operations underway, it may 
be beneficial to also employ satellite RTOCs at the agencies’ field offices that would report 
to the central RTOC for discrepancies. Ultimately, rules and regulations will have reached 
full maturity, and dependent on the final implementation of real-time technologies, 
including KM capabilities, onsite visits could be employed at a minimum or phase out 
completely. 
6.3 WORKFLOWS 
Procedural workflows for testing requirements could be fairly straightforward. In 
fact, BSEE notification is already required for BOP stump tests and initial installation tests.  
30 CFR 250.449 requires that the operator notify BSEE a minimum of 72 hours in advance 
of these two BOP tests. With this as a template, advance notice could be required for all 
the previously mentioned tests. Based on weather or operational demands regulators may 
either delay the test or prevent regulators from witnessing tests. Implementing a 72-hour 
notice requirement for all tests may be too burdensome, particularly since the predictability 
of some of these waypoints in well construction can be in flux. However, with real-time 
capabilities, a 72-hour advance notice may not be required for all tests, since regulators 






demands prevent them from witnessing in real-time. Upon completion of the tests to 
satisfaction, and the regulator verifying positive test results in accordance with the 
approved well plans, operations could continue. If some adversity is met, for example a 
LOT that results in a lower mud weight requirement than originally predicted, the operator 
could then address and modify the program for approval.   
Workflow becomes slightly more involved when it comes to drilling event 
detection. With respect to drilling events, 30 CFR 250.188 requires immediate oral 
notification of: 
 Any loss of well control, meaning surface or underground blowout, 
 Flow through a diverter, and 
 Uncontrolled flow resulting from a failure of surface equipment or procedures. 
 
While prudent to establish reporting requirements for incidents, this does not 
outright prevent an incident from occurring. Now rightly, prevention of well control 
incidents is the responsibility of the operator, and by delegation, personnel contracted by 
the operator. However, as witnessed with the Macondo blowout, sometimes these actions 
and the current oversight provided by the regulator is not enough. The advantage that 
intelligent, automated real-time data monitoring software provides is to quickly identify 
trouble events before uncontrolled development, or in the case of case-based reasoning, 
essentially predict the event before it even occurs. Thus, in the use of this capability, the 
regulator could be given the ability to be automatically notified of a potentially serious 
event, and proceed with informing involved parties and collaborating in a solution, and 








With varying focuses, both USCG and BSEE have investigation authorities on 
mobile offshore drilling units and offshore facilities. While incident investigations are 
undertaken for the purpose of both identifying violations and ensuring justice, the 
overarching idea behind investigations is to identify what went wrong, and how it might 
be prevented in the future. Incident investigations provide the 20/20 hindsight to ask the 
question related to every decision made leading up to the incident, “Why did they decide 
to do that?” In answering that question throughout an incident investigation, new barriers 
to ensure safety can be developed. Implementing requirements for operators to provide and 
record real-time data could provide a significantly better avenue to finding the answers in 
investigations more accurately, thereby helping to promote a safer industry. In the maritime 
industry, chapter V, regulation 20 of the Safety of Navigation of the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), requires that vessels to which 
SOLAS is applicable must have on board an operating voyage data recorder (VDR). A 
likeness to the commercial aviation industry’s “black box,” the VDR records data from 
critical ship systems that would be integral to identifying causal factors in an incident, 
including voice recording. Noting that some mobile offshore drilling units are subject to 
SOLAS, the idea of a requirement for an offshore drilling industry “black box” should not 
seem far-fetched, and in fact would yield better identification of causal factors and aid in 






6.5 SIMULTANEOUS OPERATIONS 
Some of this discussion on recommendations for improved regulatory oversight and 
offshore safety should be directed toward the subject of simultaneous operations. 
Relatively little work or discussion has been done with respect to developing standards or 
requirements surrounding the risk involved with conducting certain operations 
simultaneously. However, in almost any incident, particularly an incident of national and 
international significance, there is a loss of situational awareness due to a lack of 
maintaining the full operational picture. Simultaneous operations were a significant 
contributor in personnel on the Deepwater Horizon losing situational awareness and failing 
to identify the symptomatic conditions of a hydrocarbon influx. The systems and associated 
operations on board mobile offshore drilling units and offshore floating facilities are vastly 
more complex than what is commonly seen in the maritime industry. Likewise these 
vessels and facilities are vastly more complex than what is commonly seen in the land 
drilling industry. The combination of maritime and drilling operations leads to a significant 
need for communication and oversight. A primary example of a conflict of this synergy is 
the offloading of displaced fluids from the well to a supply boat, thus making it difficult to 
detect anomalous flowback from the well (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011).  
6.6 SOFTWARE 
The oil and gas industry certainly does not have a shortage of commercial software 
available for purchase. However, some are much more capable and respected than others. 
The landscape of software using data and real-time data is more or less partitioned into 
very specific applications, be it geomechanics, BOP testing, geosteering, hydraulics 






regulatory agencies could by all means solicit for a contract to develop a custom software 
suite capable of employing a full gamut of services needed by the regulator. While 
providing a “one-stop shop” this would most likely not be cost effective, and it could 
possibly be difficult to update and keep pace with the ever-evolving industry technologies.  
Instead, as this thesis has shown, commercial software is readily available for the regulator 
to implement with relative ease. Currently BOP tests can be witnessed and validated in 
real-time by a web-based, automated leak test software with fluid thermal compensation 
(Franklin, et al., 2004, Franklin et al., 2011). This software is widely used in the in the 
deepwater Gulf of Mexico community. Pressure tests verifying formation strength, casing 
shoe integrity, and cement and casing integrity can be witnessed in any real-time data 
visualization software.  A variety of this particular type of software are available and also 
in a web-based format, accessible from virtually any computer with an internet connection. 
Early kick detection using automated flowback fingerprinting or SPP/ADP may require 
more specialized software; however, the benefit in detecting anomalous flows would 
certainly outweigh costs. 
6.7 BAST RECOMMENDATIONS 
In 2013, at the request of BSEE, the National Academy of Engineering and National 
Research Council released a report with recommendations and options for implementation 
of BAST. Many points and recommendations reflect similar revelations in this thesis, but 
some are important to note. In order to address the agency’s competency and hiring 
challenges, the report recommended utilizing industry expertise in aiding assessment of 
technologies (National Academy of Engineering, 2013). In particular, BSEE should 






research and maturation of technologies that can advance industry safety. “OESI could 
serve BSEE as a competent, trusted, conflict-free agent if it is given the appropriate 
resources (National Academy of Engineering, 2013).” 
Regarding the collaborative effort needed to develop effective BAST 
implementation, the report made a very important note: 
 
BSEE has an opportunity to redefine the relationship between it and industry more 
as a partnership – one that recognizes that the final authority remains with the 
federal agency but in which the agency acknowledges that industry has much more 
technological expertise to offer (National Academy of Engineering, 2013). 
While it shouldn’t be doubted that BSEE makes a concerted effort to develop a 
fruitful relationship, both industry and BSEE must come to a level of trust in collaborating 
together to develop BAST requirements in a common vision for offshore safety. This 
relationship must be fostered not only in parties involved with BAST determinations, but 
also with respect to field personnel.   
This thesis has made mention of the value that an operator’s RTOC can have on the 
performance and safety of a well and the value that real-time monitoring could have for 
regulators to have improved oversight and awareness of compliance and safety.  
Similarly, the BAST report addresses and makes recommendations considering the value 
and use of RTOCs for well planning, monitoring, and simulating adverse conditions in 
time-critical situations (National Academy of Engineering, 2013). When looking into the 
potential for RTOC implementation, there are three possibilities: 
1. Requiring a data set that all operators must monitor in an RTOC, where upon 






simpler rule implementation, as much infrastructure is already in place. However, 
this would not accomplish the continuous oversight that is needed and possible. 
2. Requiring a data set that all operators must provide to the regulator, to the respective 
government RTOC depending on the geographic location of the well. This would 
ensure continuous oversight by the regulator, but would likely confuse the lines of 
responsibility between regulator and operators. Additionally, the infrastructure cost 
would be significant. This option may be a reasonable thought for a national 
incident “war room.” 
3. Requiring a data set that all operators must provide and monitor, providing web-
based access of real-time data to regulators. This provides the regulator continuous 
access to monitor the well construction process at any point, while not requiring the 
24/7 manpower of a regulatory RTOC. Also, this minimizes any additional 
infrastructure cost, as regulators could simply access the data from workstation 
computers. 
 
The third scenario is an optimum scenario for continuous regulatory oversight while 
still minimizing interruption and intrusion into the drilling schedule. It is strongly 
recommended that BSEE consider implementation of real-time monitoring regulation and 
monitoring to improve awareness and safety. 
Furthering recommendations for BAST implementation, there are emerging and 
maturing technologies in the industry today that should be given particular attention by 






offshore well performance and safety are pressure management drilling methods, namely 
dual gradient drilling, and wired drillpipe. 
The first venture into dual gradient drilling use in the Gulf of Mexico occurred in 
the early 2000s (Eggemeyer et al., 2001). Since then, the concept has grown in popularity 
and application, and multiple techniques now exist. At a point in which the industry 
foresaw the technical limit being reached on these highly complex deepwater wells, DGD 
introduced a new era in deepwater drilling. By lowering the hydrostatic pressure in the 
annulus, PPFG windows can be better navigated, reducing the number of casing strings 
needed.  Also, DGD provides the capability of drilling at a higher mud weight, possibly 
even kill mud weight, allowing for speedy well control operations. Being that the industry 
is seeing frequent issues with dynamic positioning (DP) systems, heavier mud used for 
DGD purposes could provide riser margin should a drive off occur and emergency 
disconnect needed. Multiple techniques of DGD have been developed and are in use today, 
some certainly more effective than others. It is recommended BSEE focus standards and 
regulatory development for this technology, in order to establish requirements for safe 
implementation of DGD methods. 
Wired drillpipe is a relatively new development in data telemetry, and by far 
exceeds the capabilities of the current methods (McNeill et al., 2008). With the 
implementation of multiple sensor packages along the drillstring, wired drillpipe can 
monitor conditions throughout the well, as compared to only knowing conditions near the 
BHA (Veeningen, 2012). With this feature, wired drillpipe can also aid in faster and more 
accurate identification of hydrocarbon influxes, as well as monitor hydrocarbon movement 






However, it is currently a much more expensive technology that the industry has trouble 
finding justifiable purpose in its implementation. Based on historic trends in technology, 
this capability will one day be determined justifiable by offshore operators, particularly as 
its latent benefits become more apparent. It is recommended regulators explore this 






















It was apparent from the Macondo incident in hindsight that the available real-time 
data could have provided insight into the unsafe conditions. The culture that fostered the 
Macondo scenario should not be shouldered by one individual, by one company, or by even 
just the oil and gas industry. More than just specific problems that the incident exposed, it 
appears to represent the culmination of years of passive regulatory oversight of dynamic 
operations, small sacrifices/negligences in safety to complete operations that accumulate 
into big problems, and an environment in which the regulator and operator are more or less 
pinned against one another in achieving safety compliance. Key conclusions from this 
research are: 
 Current real-time data monitoring technology is readily available and lends itself to 
be effectively integrated with regulations to maintain pro-active, continuous 
oversight in drilling and completion operations for measurable improved safety. 
Regulators can, in fact, build on long traditions and experience that has been 
obtained with real-time monitoring at NASA, USGS, USCG and FAA to name a 
few.  
 From the recent memory of the Macondo incident, the more recent well control 
incidents, as well as the continuing issues with DP station keeping failures in the 
Gulf of Mexico, there are compelling reasons for developing a new regulatory 
dynamic now.  
 The offshore industry, particularly in deepwater drilling, relies heavily on the use 






and proper interpretation of data will only grow in the Gulf of Mexico. Regulators 
likewise should embrace this movement for more efficient and effective safety 
compliance.  
 With the relative ease of access to real-time data through commercial software and 
web-based applications, regulators can maintain continuous oversight of rig 
operations without setting foot on board. This negates the question of whether or 
not compliance is maintained between the relatively infrequent annual, at best 
monthly, visits onsite.  
 There are tangible benefits to both operators and regulators in the adoption and 
standardization of real-time data regulatory requirements and oversight.  
Regulators can ensure a more holistic, continuous vision of operations and safety 
compliance. Likewise, with the proof of safety compliance and improved 
communications via real-time systems, operators can benefit from reduced 
interruption of unscheduled onsite inspections and potentially the elimination of 
onsite visits altogether.  
 A secondary effect of the adoption of real-time data for regulation may be the 
accelerated transition from antiquated, less reliable measurement methods, such as 
the CCR or manually recorded LOTs, to the industry adopting high quality data to 
ensure accurate measurements and objective interpretation.   
 The prevention measures in this thesis prove a more holistic view on oversight, not 
dedicated to a single cause of potential problems. They are a pro-active approach 






 These implementation concepts are compatible with –and independent of – the 
industry strides forward on recovery measures. They are also fully aligned with the 
shift from heavily prescriptive regulation toward performance-based rules. 
 Building a collaborative foundation, particularly through KM employment, 
regulatory agencies can embrace and achieve a “more with less” paradigm when 
addressing the fast technological pace of deepwater drilling, maximize corporate 
knowledge and retention. KM provides a connection that can foster a truly 
collaborative relationship between regulators, industry, and non-governmental 
organizations with a common goal of safety assurance and without confusing lines 
of authority or responsibility. This solves several key issues for regulators with 
respect to having access to experience and technical know-how, by leveraging 
industry experts that could not have normally been accessible or afforded. 
 The recommendations provided herein fall in line with many of the 
recommendations made in previous reports where BSEE could improve regulations 
and oversight.  
 
It is expected that many of the suggestions and recommendations presented in this 
thesis will find criticism and resistance, both from long-term industry insiders as well as 
more conservative forces on the regulatory side. Please note that it is argued in this thesis 
for a gradual, phased approach to testing and trialing the proposed real-time technology 
and KM approach in true collaborative fashion, under the auspices of such newly created 
industry-government collaboration entities such as the Center for Offshore Safety (COS) 






Advisory Committee (NOSAC). Only after recommended practices and workflows would 
have been validated and vetted, with input from all parties (regulator, industry, academia) 
involved, would a recommendation for implementation in actual well construction practice 
and associated oversight be made. Academia in particular can play a useful role here, by 
presenting a “neutral playing ground” where tools, techniques and workflows can be 
objectively tested without bias and/or invoking scrutiny and criticism by the public at large. 
The implementation of real-time data monitoring for improved regulatory oversight of 



















A1 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT MOBILE TECHNOLOGY APPLICABILITY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION CHECKLIST 
Table A.1 provides checklists for implementing concepts within the five focus areas 
of knowledge management. These same checklist items can be addressed for any of the 
knowledge management concepts that are to be implemented. 
Table A.1: An example of checklist considerations for knowledge management 
implementation of mobile concepts. 
Category Checklist  Mobile Concepts 
Context What is the organizational scope of the project?  When it comes to mobile concepts the scope probably should 
start with the BSEE organization as a first adopter in the field. 
Which specific challenge has the highest priority and 
needs to be address first? 
First priority is to understand in which regulatory areas mobile 
technology will have the most value.  
Governance and ownership of the KM initiative? Governance must be defined to include senior staff with BSEE 
and USCG and advisors from some operators. 
Overall agreed funding method and support  Funding specifically for the mobile portion should be set based 
on a multi-year agreement to ensure success and embedment.  
People and 
Culture 
Key stakeholders and supporters of the initiative Review BSEE and USCG and identify blockers and champions 
mainly with those having a passion around mobility. 
What the change effort must be – what are we trying to 
accomplish? 
The change in behavior is ensuring that use of mobile and 
video streaming and capture technology is embedded as part 
of the daily activities. 
Longer term support for the change management 
elements and not just a limited exercise 
Focus will be on the new hires as they are circled into the 
organization. The change will happen through correct 
onboarding. 
Current behaviors and culture within the organizations Identify specific areas of contention between BSEE and USCG.  
Technology Which technology will bring the highest value? This would be a combination of infrastructure requirements 
and choosing the right safe devices to use in the field.  
Which technology is ready now and which needs to be 
developed? 
Identify current state in the mobile devices and associated 
applications and prioritize as part of the implementation plan.  
What is affordable to be leveraged? Include cost and benefit analysis to ensure that the costs don’t 
out way just offering better working wages to field staff.  
Ensuring there is sufficient support and training  When supplying the mobile device a strong support structure 
is to be in place to correctly use the technology. 
Process Where having a formal process is valuable from a 
regulatory point of view 
Ensure that in specific inspection activities it is mandatory to 
use the mobile device to capture video. 
Where is providing less formal forms of collaboration 
would be more useful, e.g. community collaboration 
Ensuring that collaboration on the device and sharing 
experience and knowledge is more voluntary than an 
obligatory activity.  
Compliance The use of cloud based environments to share information 
and knowledge from records management compliance 
point of view. 
 
Agree up front if information is only accessible within the 
organization or can be stored security external to the 
organization. This specific as it relates to video captured 
information and social collaboration on the mobile device. 
Ensure that information security is addressed on specific 
information 
Clear regulatory agreements should be in place around 
information stored on the mobile device and how this is 
managed.  
Ensure that any copyrighted material is addressed 
correctly  
Ensure that any information that is used or shared through the 






List of Acronyms and Symbols 
AAR: After action report 
ADP: Annular discharge pressure 
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast 
AIS: Automatic Identification System 
APD: Application for permit to drill 
API: American Petroleum Institute 
ATC: Air traffic control 
BAST: Best available and safest technologies 
BLM: Bureau of Land Management 
BOEM: Bureau of Offshore Environmental Management 
BOP: Blowout preventer 
BSEE: Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
CBL: Cement bond log 
CBR: Case-based reasoning 
CCR: Circular chart recorder 
CFR: Code of Federal Regulations 
CoP: Community of practice 
COS: Center for Offshore Safety 
DGD: Dual gradient drilling 
DP: Dynamic positioning 
EEW: Early Earthquake Warning System 






FCP: Fracture closure pressure 
FIT: Formation integrity test 
FPP: Fracture propagation pressure 
ft: feet 
GAO: Government Accountability Office 
GOM: Gulf of Mexico 
HPHT: High pressure, high temperature 
IADC: International Association of Drilling Contractors 
IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
km: kilometer 
KM: Knowledge management 
LOT: Leak-off Test 
MASP: Maximum anticipated surface pressure 
MODU: Mobile offshore drilling unit 
MPD: Managed pressure drilling 
MSE: Mechanical specific energy 
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NOSAC: National Offshore Safety Advisory Committee 
NPT: Non-productive time 
OCSLA: Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
OCS: Outer continental shelf 
OESI: Offshore Energy Safety Institute 






ppg: pounds per gallon 
psi: pounds per square inch 
psi/min: pounds per square inch per minute 
PWD: Pressure while drilling 
RP: Recommended practice 
RTOC: Real-time operations center 
SOLAS: Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
SPE: Society of Petroleum Engineers 
SPP: Standpipe pressure 
TCLD: Thermal compensation leak detection 
TOC: Top-of-cement 
U.S.: United States 
USCG: United States Coast Guard 
USGS: United States Geological Survey 
UT: University of Texas 
VDR: Voyage data recorder 
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